Acting: Between Freedom and Rationality. Leibniz, Crusius, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason

该项目旨在通过关注历史辩论来讨论一个在当代自由意志讨论中经常被忽视的问题。这是为了看看结果如何应用于当代的讨论。后一种争论倾向于集中在物理决定论和自由的兼容性问题上，而计划中的项目则集中在理性和自由的兼容性问题上，通过询问在多大程度上可以既自由又理性地行动。这个问题对自由意志主义的自由观念构成了严重威胁。根据自由意志主义者的观点，自由等于在行动之间做出真实的选择的可能性。问题是，假设行为人应该理性地行动，那么这意味着什么。由于非理性主义是自由主义的历史先驱，该项目将通过讨论克鲁修斯（1715-1775）和莱布尼茨（1646-1716）的理性主义批评家的非理性主义立场来回答这个问题。此外，这些项目旨在重建这里所涉及的理由概念，因为历史辩论是在关于充分理由原则的辩论的背景下发生的。因此，它可以重建当代形而上学中关于根据概念本身的争论的历史背景。

The project aims at discussing a problem which is often neglected in contemporary discussions of free will by focusing on a historical debate. It is to see how the results apply within in the contemporary discussion. The latter debate tends to focus on the problem of compatibility of physical determinism and freedom, whereas the planned project concentrates on the problem of compatibility of rationality and freedom by asking to which degree it is possible to act both freely and rationally. This problem poses a serious threat to libertarian conceptions of freedom. According to the libertarian, freedom amounts to the possibility of real choice between actions. The question is what this amounts to, given that the agent is supposed to act rationally. Since voluntarism is the historical precursor of libertarism, the project will answer the question by discussing exemplarily the voluntaristic position of Crusius (1715-1775) and the rationalistic critic of Leibniz (1646-1716). Further, the projects aims at reconstructing the conception of ground involved here, since the historical debate takes place in the context of the debate concerning the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). It can thereby reconstruct the historical background of the debate concerning the very notion of ground in contemporary metaphysics.