A1: Inductive metaphysics; methods of metaphysics

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The aim of A1 is a detailed comparison of the programs of inductive metaphysics (IM) and logical empiricism (LE). It is intended as a follow-up to project A1 of the first 3-year period of this research unit, “The Research Program of Inductive Metaphysics from Gustav Theodor Fechner to Erich Becher and beyond.” The main focus in the first 3-year period was a historical and systematic reconstruction of the research program of IM as it emerged in the 19th century (G.Th. Fechner, R.H. Lotze, E. v. Hartmann, W. Wundt and others) and early 20th century (O. Külpe, E. Becher, A. Wenzl). In the second funding period, project A1 aims to use the results of the first period fora comparison of IM and LE. The main thesis is that, while at first glance it may look as if IM and LE are completely contrary positions, a closer examination shows that there are many interesting points of contact or even convergence between LE and IM, especially when one does not restrict LE to the narrow phase of the Vienna Circle and its protagonists. These points of contact range from the correspondencebetween Moritz Schlick and Erich Becher to Rudolf Carnap’s later softening of the boundary between science and metaphysics, W.V. Quine’s naturalized metaphysics, and Michael Friedman’s reconsideration of LE. A thorough investigation of these points of contact will shed light on:(i) the relations between the programs of IM and LE,(ii) the conceptions of metaphysics advocated by the proponents of both programs, and(iii) the evolution of these conceptions over time.This will contribute to the exploration of the possibility of metaphysics on an inductive basis.