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Truthful coordination at loading docks: A market design approach for transportation logistics (TRUCKS)

装货码头的真实协调：运输物流（卡车）的市场设计方法

基本信息

批准号：
405008493
负责人：
Dr. Paul Karänke
金额：
--
依托单位：
Chair of Decision Sciences and Systems
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2018
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2017-12-31 至 2020-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/405008493?language=en
关键词：
Truthful coordination loading docks market

项目摘要

We study the design of electronic market mechanisms for the coordination of carriers in transportation logistics. Long waiting times at loading docks of retailers are a widespread phenomenon causing substantial inefficiencies in retail transportation logistics. The design of coordination mechanisms for such problems is challenging for two reasons: First, mechanisms should be resistant to manipulation and set incentives for truthful revelation of preferences for carriers. Secondly, if a mechanism is truthful, computing an efficient allocation of time slots is a combinatorial, computationally hard problem. The problem is representative for many computationally hard allocation problems with multiple decision makers as they arise in a networked economy.We compare existing combinatorial auction mechanisms to achieve coordination among carriers and develop extensions based on existing approximation approaches. We aim at an improved solution quality by leveraging results from research on near-optimal allocations. For most real-world problems one can find near-optimal solutions of combinatorial optimization problems for large instances very fast, while proving optimality is intractable.While auctions are common for truckload procurement, carriers' willingness to pay for loading dock reservations is low. The question arises if coordination can also be achieved without payments; i.e., with matching markets where resources are allocated without monetary transfers. Hence, we additionally analyze and extend existing work on matching with complementarities, which commonly approximates feasibility, and investigate the degree of average-case feasibility violations and efficiency.Due to uncertainties in travel and service times, we finally consider mechanisms that take changes of supply and demand in allocation decisions into account. We build on prior work on online coordination and investigate which mechanisms and approximation techniques can be applied to our settings.The resulting mechanisms should contribute to an important, yet challenging problem at the interface of information systems and operations research: the design of mechanisms that are resistant to strategic manipulation for computationally hard allocation problems. Progress in this area would have substantial impact far beyond the transportation logistics problem. Apart from our theoretical analyses, we aim at extensive numerical experiments based on field data available from previous cooperations with several industry partners.

研究了运输物流中承运人协调的电子市场机制设计。零售商装货码头等待时间过长是零售业运输物流效率低下的普遍现象。这类问题的协调机制设计具有挑战性，原因有二：首先，机制应具有抗操纵性，并为运营商真实披露偏好设置激励机制。其次，如果一个机制是真实的，计算一个有效的时隙分配是一个组合的，计算困难的问题。这个问题是网络经济中出现的许多涉及多个决策者的难以计算的分配问题的代表。我们比较了现有的组合拍卖机制，以实现运营商之间的协调，并在现有近似方法的基础上开发了扩展。我们的目标是通过利用接近最优分配的研究结果来提高解决方案的质量。对于大多数现实世界的问题，人们可以非常快地找到大型实例组合优化问题的近最优解，而证明最优性是棘手的。虽然拍卖在卡车采购中很常见，但承运商支付装货码头预订费用的意愿很低。问题是，是否也可以在没有付款的情况下实现协调；也就是说，在没有货币转移的情况下配置资源的匹配市场。因此，我们进一步分析和扩展了现有的关于互补匹配的工作，互补匹配通常近似于可行性，并研究了平均情况下可行性违规的程度和效率。由于出行和服务时间的不确定性，我们最后考虑分配决策中考虑供给和需求变化的机制。我们建立在先前的在线协调工作和调查哪些机制和近似技术可以应用于我们的设置。由此产生的机制应该有助于解决信息系统和运筹学界面上的一个重要但具有挑战性的问题：为计算困难的分配问题设计能够抵抗战略操纵的机制。这一领域的进展所产生的重大影响将远远超出运输物流问题。除了理论分析之外，我们还针对以前与几个行业合作伙伴合作获得的现场数据进行了广泛的数值实验。