Frontiers in Game Theory

博弈论前沿

• 批准号: 16203011
• 负责人: OKADA Akira
• 金额: $ 27.62万
• 依托单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2004 至 2007
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203011/
• 关键词: game theory; economic behavior; dynamic games; bargaining games; repeated games; incentive; information; environments

This research project investigates various problems of strategic interdependence in institution, market mechanisms, organizations and human behavior as frontiers in game theory. The project consists of the following three research units.1.Dynamic games of organizations, markets and institutionThe unit has developed theories of macro equilibrium dynamics and non-cooperative bargaining games. We derive conditions of dynamic systems for convergence to stationary points, indeterminacy and complex oscillation and chaos. We also present a non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff allocations, and define a new cooperative solution concept, called the Nash core, synthesizing the Nash bargaining solution and the core. Experiments of bargaining and public goods provision are conducted.2. Game analysis of knowledge, information and incentiveThe unit has developed theories of information, incentive and repeated games. We investigate strategic effects of ambiguous information in the framework of non-Bayesian decision theory, and derive axioms of the Myerson value in cooperative games. We also prove a general folk theorem in repeated games with monitoring costs, and analyze the monopoly pricing of durable goods with network externality.3. Applied and policy analysis of game theoryThe unit has developed applications of game theory to social choice, environmental problems and international economics. We investigate the possibility of social order compromising efficiency and fairness, and characteristics of individual information required for constructing social preference order. We also consider policy implications of bargaining theory to international negotiations in global warming problems. Applying network games, we analyze the formation of free trade agreements (FTA), stability of fair trade, and tariff competition. (248)

本研究课题以制度、市场机制、组织、人的行为等作为博弈论的前沿领域，探讨战略相互依存的各种问题。本计画由以下三个研究单元组成：一、组织、市场与制度的动态博弈本单元发展了宏观均衡动态与非合作议价博弈的理论。给出了动力系统收敛于不动点、不确定性、复振荡和混沌的条件。我们还提出了一个非合作谈判模型的联盟形成和收益分配，并定义了一个新的合作解决方案的概念，称为纳什核心，综合纳什谈判解决方案和核心。进行了讨价还价实验和公共物品供给实验.知识、信息和激励的博弈分析本单位发展了信息、激励和重复博弈理论。本文在非贝叶斯决策理论框架下研究了模糊信息的策略效应，推导了合作博弈中的迈尔森值公理。证明了具有监督费用的重复博弈中的一个一般性定理，并分析了具有网络外部性的耐用品垄断定价问题.博弈论的应用和政策分析该单位开发了博弈论在社会选择、环境问题和国际经济学中的应用。我们探讨了社会秩序对效率和公平的妥协的可能性，以及构建社会偏好秩序所需的个人信息的特征。我们还考虑了讨价还价理论对全球变暖问题国际谈判的政策含义。运用网络博弈分析了自由贸易协定（FTA）的形成、公平贸易的稳定性和关税竞争。（248）

项目成果

Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited

无风险与有风险的谈判程序：重温奥曼-罗斯争议

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: Japanese Economic Review 58(2)
• 作者: Kubo;Kenitirou;Akira Okada
• 通讯作者: Akira Okada

Agreeable bets with multiple priors

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.004
• 发表时间: 2006-05
• 期刊: J. Econ. Theory
• 作者: Atsushi Kajii;Takashi Ui

Free Trade Networks

• DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.438502
• 发表时间: 2003-06
• 期刊: FEEM Working Paper Series
• 作者: T. Furusawa;Hideo Konishi

"Stochastic Optimal Policies when the Discount Rate Vanishes"

“贴现率消失时的随机最优策略”

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31(4)
• 作者: Junko Doi;Kazuo Nishimura and Koji Shimomura;Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti;Kazuo Nishimura and Lakshmi K. Raut;Kazuo Nishimura and John Stachurski
• 通讯作者: Kazuo Nishimura and John Stachurski

Stability of stochastic optimal growth models: a new approach

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.001
• 发表时间: 2005-05
• 期刊: J. Econ. Theory
• 作者: K. Nishimura;J. Stachurski