The analysis of the changing Japanese core executive and policy making process of finance reform

本研究以财政改革为个案，探讨1990年代的选举改革与行政改革如何改变日本的政策制定过程。选举改革、行政改革和执政党内部政策制定制度的变化，抑制了后座议员的分肥行为，加强了核心干部代表普遍（公众）利益的领导。本研究发现，为了提高一般（公共）利益的可行性，政府、执政党和官僚之间形成政策调整的协调组织是重要的。

This study examined how the electoral reform and the administrative reform in 1990's changed Japanese policy making process by case study of finance reform. The electoral reform, the administrative reform and the change of policy making system within ruling party depressed backbencher's pork-barrel action and heightened leadership of core executives to represent general(public) interests. This study found that in order to improve the feasibility of general(public) interests, formation of the coordinating organizations which adjusted polices between government, ruling party and bureaucrats is important.