Studies on Public Economics: Approaches from the Theory of Mechanism Design

我们研究了机构设计理论的一个问题。我们研究规则(或社会选择函数)，通过这些规则，代理从一组对象中选择一个子集。我们研究在其上存在非平凡策略防规则的域。我们证明了可分偏好集是满足防策略性和无否决权的规则存在的极大域。我们还构建了一个二语习得的大型协调博弈模型。

We study a problem of mechanism design theory. We study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. We also construct a large coordination game model of second-language acquisition.