The Determination of Cross-shareholdings and the effect of Its Dissolution

我们的主要实证结果总结如下：我们的主要实证结果总结如下：(i)在银行与债券融资方面，托宾q值较小、利息覆盖率较低的日本公司明显更依赖银行贷款。（ii）关于主银行在银行贷款中的作用，托宾q值较小、利息覆盖率较低的日本企业明显更多地依赖于主银行提供的短期银行贷款。（三）在公司对承销商的选择上，利息覆盖率和资产负债率较高的日本公司更有可能使用其主要的银行证券子公司而不是其他银行证券子公司作为债券承销的主承销商。（iv）关于交叉持股，较小的托宾q表明日本公司主要银行的持股比其他金融中介机构的持股要多得多。特别是，结果（ii）和（iii）强烈表明，主要银行系统的贷款行为受到限制，因为主要银行被迫向增长前景较小且更有可能陷入财务困境的公司提供额外贷款，而主要银行为了自身利益滥用其私人信息，牺牲了债券承销中其他银行的利益。此外，结果（iv）可能意味着对主要银行系统的持股持负面看法。这些发现表明，大多数日本主要银行无法自行减少不良贷款。来克服这个问题。当局可能需要将大多数日本主要银行国有化，并试图组织一个新的银行体系，以促进银行向那些增长前景更大、但更有可能陷入财务困境的公司提供贷款。

Our principal empirical results are summarized as follows :Our principal empirical results are summarized as follows :(i)In relation to bank versus bond financing, Japanese firms with a smaller Tobin's q and lower interest coverage ratios depend significantly more on bank loans.(ii)In relation to the role of main banks in bank loans, Japanese firms with a smaller Tobin's q and lower interest coverage ratios depend significantly more on short-term bank loans provided by main banks.(iii)In relation to the firm's choice of underwriters, Japanese firms with higher interest coverage and higher debt-asset ratios are more likely to use their main bank-owned securities subsidiaries than other bank-owned securities subsidiaries as a lead underwriter for bond underwriting.(iv)In relation to cross-shareholdings, a smaller Tobin's q indicates that Japanese firms have significantly more shareholdings by main banks than by the other financial intermediaries.In particular, results (ii) and (iii) indicate strongly that the lending behavior of the main bank system is constrained because main banks are forced to make additional loans to firms that have a smaller prospect of growth and a greater likelihood of financial distress, whereas main banks misuse their private information for their self-interest at the expense of the other banks in bond underwriting. Furthermore, result (iv) may imply a negative view of the main bank system with respect to shareholdings. These findings suggest that most of the major Japanese banks cannot decrease their bad loans by themselves. To overcome this problem. the authorities may need to nationalize most of the major Japanese banks and attempt to organize a new banking system that promotes bank lending to firms with greater prospects for growth but a greater likelihood of financial distress.