权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Experimental psychological studies of the inductibility of responses into prosperity state in social interaction situation

社会交往情境中繁荣状态反应诱导性的实验心理学研究

基本信息

批准号：
60510036
负责人：
TERAOKA Takashi
金额：
$ 1.28万
依托单位：
Hokkaido University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1985
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1985 至 1986
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-60510036/
关键词：
Tit-for-tat Prisoner's dilemma Decomposed game Experimental game 方略

项目摘要

"Prisoner's dilemma" means a typical psychological situation involving social conflicts between the motives of the "individual rationality" and the "group rationality" for each player in the experimental game situations. In the situation where the same payoff matrix is repeatedly represented to both the two players, they used to select the non-cooperative alternatives to fall into the "mutual poverty cell" in the prisoner's dilemma. How the players can extricate from this cell has been one of the important subjects in the prisoner's dilemma studies. The two experimental studies were performed to find the concrete means to induce the player's responses into the prosperity cell by focussing to the following aspects: first, the effects of "tit-for-tat" strategies, and second, the effects of the player's cognitive form for the payoff structure which was involved in the situation based upon the "composite decomposed games". The main findings in them were as follows.In the Experiment I, 1) There were several kinds of strategies concerning the tit-for-tat, and the optimum strategy depended upon the purpose of the player as a "controller" for the situation. 2) For maximizing the joint gain between the two players, the "simultaneous tit-for-tat" was the most adjustable strategy. 3) For maximizing the individual gain, the "tit-for-tat with double revenge" was ajustable strategy. 4) The magnifying power of the revenge for the most adjustable strategy was not decided in the experiment. In the Experiment II, 1) The "composite decomposed games" were not so effective to induce the player's responses into the prosperity cell as they were. 2) The control of the information indicating the structure of situation for the other player was so effective to induce his responses into the prosperity cell. 3) The delay of revenge for the betrayer was not effective.

“囚徒困境”是指在实验性博弈情境中，参与者的“个体理性”与“群体理性”动机之间发生冲突的一种典型的心理状态。在相同的支付矩阵被重复呈现给两个参与者的情况下，他们习惯于选择不合作的方案，从而陷入囚徒困境中的“共同贫困细胞”。博弈者如何从这个牢笼中解脱出来，一直是囚徒困境研究的重要课题之一。通过两个实验研究，分别考察了“达特”策略和“复合分解博弈”情境中参与者认知形式对支付结构的影响，以寻求将参与者的反应引入繁荣细胞的具体方法。主要研究结果如下：（1）在实验一中，有几种针锋相对的策略，最佳策略取决于参与者作为“控制者”的目的。2)为了最大化双方的共同收益，“同时达特”是最可调整的策略。3)为了个人利益最大化，“达特，双重报复”是一种可调整的策略。4)最大可调策略的报复放大率在实验中没有确定。在实验二中，1）“复合分解游戏”并没有像它们那样有效地诱导参与者的反应进入繁荣细胞。2)对另一个参与者的情境结构信息的控制是如此有效，以至于诱导他的反应进入繁荣细胞。3)对背叛者的报复的延迟是没有效果的。