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Political-Economic Analysis of Optimal Urban Management

优化城市管理的政治经济分析

基本信息

批准号：
07630001
负责人：
SASAKI Komei
金额：
$ 1.22万
依托单位：
Tohoku University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1995
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1995 至 1996
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

The shortcomings of the literature on political-economic model of urban management are that ; the role of the poor in urban production is not discussed ; spatial aspects such as city size or land constraints are not taken into consideration the present research intends to overcome those drawbacks, Setting a city with residents of two classes, it is hypothesized that developers as landowmers in a city decide how much land is renteal to whom at what level of rent so as to maximize rental revenue. Only rich people are concerned with urbarn enrvironment quality which depends on the ratio of the number of the poor to that of the richi in other words, the rich perceive the negative neighborhood externality from increased number of the poor in a city, This negative externality works to denease the bid-rent of the rich. On the other hand, the income of the rich increases with the amount of cheap labor supplied by the poor and thereby the bid-rent of the rich becomes higher. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the rich, There exists an optimal population composition such that both classes reside, in a city. Among the comparative static analyzes, of interest is the result of an increase in the extent of negative neighborhood externality. The analysis shows that when the poor's composition rate is high, an increase in the deteriaration rate of urban environment due to the high density of the poor might lead to increasing of the poor's density, thereby furthering urban environmental deterioration as a result. In order to avoid farther deterioration of unban environment, government, whether central or local, should provide better public housing, improve urban transportation systems, presrve sufficient open spaces, and promote education and public health programs.

城市经营的政治经济学模型文献的不足之处在于：没有讨论穷人在城市生产中的作用;空间方面，如城市规模或土地的限制没有考虑到本研究旨在克服这些缺点，设置一个城市的两个阶层的居民，假设开发商作为城市中的土地所有者决定以什么水平的租金将多少土地出租给谁，以便最大化租金收入。只有富人才关心城市的环境质量，而环境质量取决于穷人与富人的比例，也就是说，富人从城市中穷人数量的增加中感受到了负的邻里外部性，这种负外部性降低了富人的出价。另一方面，富人的收入随着穷人提供的廉价劳动力数量的增加而增加，从而富人的出价租金变得更高。因此，从富人的角度来看，存在一个最佳的人口组成，使得两个阶层都居住在一个城市。在比较静态的分析中，利息是邻里负外部性程度增加的结果。分析表明，当贫困人口构成率高时，由于贫困人口密度高而导致的城市环境恶化率的增加，可能导致贫困人口密度的增加，从而加剧城市环境的恶化。为了避免城市环境的进一步恶化，政府，无论是中央还是地方，应该提供更好的公共住房，改善城市交通系统，保留足够的开放空间，并促进教育和公共卫生计划。