Strategic Behavior of Firms and Trade and Industrial Policies

本研究项目共完成了三篇论文。在第一篇题为“国内和出口卡特尔的战略效应：静态和动态分析”的论文中，我们发现，当出口需求相对于国内需求具有更大的价格弹性时，允许竞争性产业有意组建国内或出口卡特尔，与竞争均衡相比，可能会降低静态意义上的国家福利。但是，从国家福利的角度来看，产业承担降低成本的研发投资的动态激励往往会变得过度。在第二篇论文“国际寡头垄断中的非经济目标与巴格瓦蒂的目标原则”中，我们研究了当母国政府追求某些非经济目标时，所谓的巴格瓦蒂目标原则是否也适用于国际古诺双寡头垄断。最重要的发现是，他的原则可以更普遍地应用于寡头垄断环境，但受制于非经济目标的次优税收政策通常需要进口关税以及直接影响目标变量的货币工具，后者的权重更大。在上一篇题为“自愿进口扩张与政府承诺”的论文中，我们探讨了自愿进口扩张（VIE）在国际寡头垄断中的作用。主要发现是，当政府不能预先承诺国内销售税或进口补贴作为VIE的手段时，那么就会出现外国公司影响均衡的战略激励。更具体地说，为了实现目标进口量，当政府选择取决于企业定价决策的国内销售税时，外国企业在定价上选择混合策略，所得到的均衡与VER均衡相似。另一方面，当政府选择进口补贴时，不存在均衡。少

There are three pieces of papers whcih are completed by the present research project. In the first paper entitle "Strategic Effects of Domestic anbd Export Cartels : Their Static and Dynamic Analysis", we have found that allowing the competitive industry to form domestic or export cartels in a delberate fashion may lowser the national welfare in the static sense compared with the competitive equilibrium when the export demand is relatively more price-elastic than the domestic demand. But the industry's dynamic incentive to undertake the costreducing R&D investment tends to become excessive from the viewpoint of the natonal welfare,In the second paper entitled "Non-Economic Objectives and Bhagwati's Targeting Principle in International Oligopoly, " we studied whether the so-called Bhagwati's targetig principle carries over to international cournot duopoly when the home country's government seeks for some non-economic objective. The most important finding is that his principle can be gen … More eralized to oligopoly setting, but the second second-best optimal tax plicy subject to a non-economic objective generally requires import tariff as well as the pecuniary instruments directly affecting the target variable with more weights on the latter.In the last paper entitlte "Voluntary Import Expansion and Government Commitments", we have explored into the effects of voluntary import expnasion (VIE) in international oligopoly a la Bertrand. The major finding is that when the government cannor precommit to either domestic sales taxs or import subsidies as VIE means, then there arises the foreign firm's strategic incentive to affect the equilibirum. More specifically, when the government chooses the domestic sales taxs contingent on the firms's pricing decisions so as to achieve the target import volume, then the foreign firm chooses a mixed strategy in pricing, and the resulting equilibirium is just like the VER equilibirum. On the other hand, when the government chooses import subsidies, there exists no equilibirum. Less