Job assignments and the ability level of workers in business firm

当一家公司要雇佣一名已经在其他公司工作的新员工时，雇主对该工人的能力信息是不利的。为了克服这种不利的情况，雇主可以利用工人目前的“工作分配”作为他/她能力的信号。通过观察当前的工作分配，可以缓解已经工作过工人的公司拥有的信息和将要雇用工人的公司拥有的信息之间关于工人能力水平的信息不对称。在这种情况下，本研究澄清了以下三个结果。首先，工资率往往与工作有关，而不是与能力水平有关。其次，员工的工作分配应该往往效率低下。第三，这种低效倾向于与“企业专用性人力资本”水平负相关。为了对这些问题进行分析，本研究采用了“代际重叠模型”对其进行分析。

When a firm is going to employ a new worker who has been already employed in other firm, the employer is disadvantageous about the information of the worker's ability. In order to overcome this disadvantageous situation, the employer can use the present "job assignment" of the worker as a signal of his/her ability. The asymmetry of the information about the ability level of the worker between the information owned by the firm in which worker has been already worked and the information owned by the firm which is going to employ the worker can be mitigated by observing present job assignments.Under such a situation, the following three results are clarified by this research. To begin with, wage rate tends to relate to the jobs rather than the ability level. Second, job assignments of the employee should tend to be inefficient. Third, this inefficiency tends to negatively correlate with the level of "firm specific human capitals". In order to analyze these issues, the research analyzes them using "overlapping-generations model."