Devolving the Monopoly on Violence: the Security Implications of the Transfer of State Functions to Traditional Institutions

下放对暴力的垄断：国家职能向传统机构转移的安全影响

• 批准号: 532401382
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Alexander De Juan
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/532401382?language=en
• 关键词: Devolving; Monopoly; Violence; Security; Implications

For many people around the globe, the promises of the ‘Weberian state’ have not materialized. They live in contexts in which the state is unable to uphold a monopoly on violence – because formal state institutions are absent, corrupt or a source of insecurity themselves. Nonetheless, academic and policy debates on “fragile” contexts remain largely state-centric, seeing the absence of the state as a source of violence and its expansion as the most promising remedy. In some of the most insecure areas, states and citizens have turned to alternative solutions: in Somalia, clan-based systems of conflict management have assumed responsibility for maintaining order. In the light of the weakness of the central Afghan state, traditional councils and tribal militias have been providing security in rural areas. Confronted with excessive criminal violence, communities in southern Mexico have made use of their right to replace formal state institutions with customary systems of governance and security provision. These conflict-affected states have been trying to establish security not through the expansion of state institutions but through their selective retreat. They devolve core functions in justice and security to communal institutions that draw on tradition and local customs for legitimation (in the following simply: “traditional institutions”). This process entails a fundamental reconfiguration of the tripartite relationships between the state, traditional institutions and citizens. Thus far, however, we lack a clear understanding of the consequences of this process: How does the devolution of state functions affect citizens’ security in areas governed by customary arrangements? What are the conditions, features and mechanisms of successful devolution? Our project aims to contribute to addressing these gaps. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses focus on the case of Mexico, leveraging a unique opportunity to investigate an ongoing process of devolution of state functions to traditional institutions. Substantive spatio-temporal variation in structural conditions and legal provisions allows us to investigate the role of contexts and features of devolution. Observing this process as it unfolds, allows us to trace the mechanisms driving its effects. Our analyses build on an international cooperation with Stanford University and four “Intercultural Universities” in Mexico. The results promise to advance our understanding of the dynamics and effects of varying institutional configurations in contexts of insecurity. Moreover, they can inform peacebuilding strategies beyond the dominant state-centred paradigm.

对地球仪上的许多人来说，“韦伯国家”的承诺并没有实现。他们生活在国家无法垄断暴力的环境中--因为正式的国家机构不存在、腐败或本身就是不安全的根源。尽管如此，关于“脆弱”环境的学术和政策辩论仍然主要以国家为中心，认为国家的缺失是暴力的根源，而国家的扩张是最有希望的补救办法。在一些最不安全的地区，国家和公民已转向其他解决办法：在索马里，以部族为基础的冲突管理系统承担了维持秩序的责任。鉴于阿富汗中部国家的弱点，传统委员会和部落民兵一直在农村地区提供安全保障。面对过度的犯罪暴力，墨西哥南部的社区利用其权利，以传统的治理和安全保障制度取代正式的国家机构。这些受冲突影响的国家一直试图通过选择性撤退而不是通过扩大国家机构来建立安全。它们将司法和安全方面的核心职能移交给社区机构，这些机构利用传统和地方习俗获得合法性（以下简称“传统机构”）。这一进程需要从根本上重新配置国家、传统机构和公民之间的三方关系。然而，到目前为止，我们对这一进程的后果缺乏明确的理解：国家职能的移交如何影响习惯安排管辖地区的公民安全？成功移交的条件、特点和机制是什么？我们的项目旨在为解决这些差距做出贡献。我们的定性和定量分析集中在墨西哥的情况下，利用一个独特的机会，调查正在进行的国家职能下放到传统机构的过程。结构条件和法律的规定的实质性时空变化使我们能够调查的背景和功能的下放的作用。观察这一过程，因为它的展开，使我们能够跟踪驱动其影响的机制。我们的分析建立在与斯坦福大学和墨西哥四所“跨文化大学”的国际合作基础上。这些结果有望促进我们对不安全环境中不同机构配置的动态和影响的理解。此外，它们可以为建设和平战略提供信息，而不是以国家为中心的主导模式。