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Law and Economics on M&A and Strategic Alliance

M法与经济学

基本信息

批准号：
18530210
负责人：
TANAKA Satoru
金额：
$ 1.22万
依托单位：
Kobe City University of Foreign Studies
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2006
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2006 至 2007
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530210/
关键词：
M&A Strategic Alliance Buyer Power Antitrust Law Waterbed Effect 戦略的提携優越的地位の濫用 M＆A 拮抗力

项目摘要

The purpose of this research is to clarify the incentives of M&A and strategic alliance among the firms, and to analyze the welfare implication of these behaviors in the viewpoint of law and economics. The analysis focused to the vertical relationship between the firms shows that the incentive of M&A and strategic alliance is strongly affected by the buyer power and the competitive conditions of upstream and downstream industries. Therefore, we concentrated the retail industry and the ICT industries in which the vertical relationship played the important role to M&A and strategic alliance.In the ICT industries, it is shown that the regulation on the platform may have the critical welfare implication on the performance of the industries by the legal analysis. On the other hand, in the retail industry, M&A and the strategic alliance are undertaken over the relatively independent regional market. Considering this characteristics, the decrease in the input price which is attained by the buyer power of the consolidated firm causes the increase in the input price of the independent retailers (This effect is called by the "waterbed effect"). As the existence of this effect means that there are the negative externalities of buyer power of the consolidated firm, the administration of competition policy on the regulation of M&A and strategic alliance have to take into account of this effect.

本研究的目的是阐明企业间并购和战略联盟的动机，并从法律和经济学的角度分析这些行为的福利含义。对企业间纵向关系的分析表明，买方力量和上下游产业的竞争状况对企业并购和战略联盟的激励有很大影响。因此，本文将纵向关系对并购和战略联盟起重要作用的零售行业和ICT行业集中在一起，通过法律分析表明，在ICT行业中，对平台的管制可能对行业绩效具有关键的福利含义。另一方面，在零售业，并购和战略联盟是在相对独立的区域市场上进行的。考虑到这一特点，合并后企业的买方力量所获得的投入价格的降低会导致独立零售商投入价格的上升(这种效应称为“水床效应”)。由于这一效应的存在意味着合并后企业的买方力量存在负外部性，因此竞争政策对企业并购和战略联盟的规制必须考虑这一影响。