Law and Economics on M&A and Strategic Alliance

本研究旨在厘清企业并购与战略联盟的动因，并从法学和经济学的角度分析这些行为的福利含义。对企业间纵向关系的分析表明，并购与战略联盟的激励受到买方力量和上下游产业竞争条件的强烈影响。因此，我们集中研究了零售业和ICT行业，其中垂直关系对并购和战略联盟发挥了重要作用。在ICT行业中，法律分析表明，平台监管可能对行业绩效产生关键的福利影响。另一方面，在零售业，并购和战略联盟是在相对独立的区域市场上进行的。考虑到这一特点，合并企业的买方力量所获得的投入价格下降导致独立零售商的投入价格上升（这种效应被称为“水床效应”）。由于这一效应的存在意味着合并后企业的买方能力存在负外部性，因此在规制并购和战略联盟的竞争政策管理中必须考虑到这一效应。

The purpose of this research is to clarify the incentives of M&A and strategic alliance among the firms, and to analyze the welfare implication of these behaviors in the viewpoint of law and economics. The analysis focused to the vertical relationship between the firms shows that the incentive of M&A and strategic alliance is strongly affected by the buyer power and the competitive conditions of upstream and downstream industries. Therefore, we concentrated the retail industry and the ICT industries in which the vertical relationship played the important role to M&A and strategic alliance.In the ICT industries, it is shown that the regulation on the platform may have the critical welfare implication on the performance of the industries by the legal analysis. On the other hand, in the retail industry, M&A and the strategic alliance are undertaken over the relatively independent regional market. Considering this characteristics, the decrease in the input price which is attained by the buyer power of the consolidated firm causes the increase in the input price of the independent retailers (This effect is called by the "waterbed effect"). As the existence of this effect means that there are the negative externalities of buyer power of the consolidated firm, the administration of competition policy on the regulation of M&A and strategic alliance have to take into account of this effect.