Law and Economics on M&A and Strategic Alliance

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The purpose of this research is to clarify the incentives of M&A and strategic alliance among the firms, and to analyze the welfare implication of these behaviors in the viewpoint of law and economics. The analysis focused to the vertical relationship between the firms shows that the incentive of M&A and strategic alliance is strongly affected by the buyer power and the competitive conditions of upstream and downstream industries. Therefore, we concentrated the retail industry and the ICT industries in which the vertical relationship played the important role to M&A and strategic alliance.In the ICT industries, it is shown that the regulation on the platform may have the critical welfare implication on the performance of the industries by the legal analysis. On the other hand, in the retail industry, M&A and the strategic alliance are undertaken over the relatively independent regional market. Considering this characteristics, the decrease in the input price which is attained by the buyer power of the consolidated firm causes the increase in the input price of the independent retailers (This effect is called by the "waterbed effect"). As the existence of this effect means that there are the negative externalities of buyer power of the consolidated firm, the administration of competition policy on the regulation of M&A and strategic alliance have to take into account of this effect.