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Research on Corporate Strategy and Management Control for Open Innovation

开放式创新的企业战略与管理控制研究

基本信息

批准号：
18330048
负责人：
KIKUTANI Tatsuya
金额：
$ 4.38万
依托单位：
Kyoto University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
财政年份：
2006
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2006 至 2007
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Initial field research concerned with joint research, technology alliances, roles of third party such as technology information providers, that we conducted in Japan, Silicon Valley, and greater London, provided insights that various issues related to open innovation processes can be analyzed from a transaction cost economics perspective. In the context of open innovation, there are two types of transaction costs; those "costs associated with searching for counterpart" and those "costs associated with internal coordination". We conducted a survey research targeted at listed manufacturing companies in Japan to examine this perspective with a large sample. The survey was sent out to corporate research centers that and domains. We questioned issues related to "selling technology to outside" and "buying technology from outside" at corporate head quarter, and those related to "buying technology from outside" at domains. We obtained following findings from the large sample survey research. ( … More 1) Both "selling technology to outside" and "buying technology from outside" are more likely to be observed when there is an organizational unit whose role is to search counterpart. We interpret that this is because those organizational units effectively decrease search cost in general. On the contrary, costs associated with internal coordination differ by types of transactions and by types of organizational structures. (2) "Selling technology to outside" is less likely to happen when the number of domains in a company increases. This is because "sell or use" decision concerning the technology developed at corporate research centers requires coordination with domains, and the coordination costs increase as the number of domain increases. Consistent with this finding, "selling technology to outside" decreases when there is decentralized management control system where power of domain is relatively strong. This type of coordination costs become less decisive and it is more likely to occur that "selling technology to outside" when there exist mechanisms that facilitate sharing technological information among domains. On the other hand, it is more likely to happen that the technology push type of "selling technology to outside" when corporate research centers have relatively strong power. (3) "Buying technology from outside" is more likely to happen when the number of domains increases. The need-pull type of "buying technology from outside", which reflect needs of domains, is more likely to happen when there is decentralized management control system where domain has relatively strong power. (4) This affects "buying technology from outside" at domains. "Buying technology from outside" at domains is less likely to happen when management control system is more decentralized. Less

我们在日本、硅谷和大伦敦进行的关于联合研究、技术联盟、第三方（如技术信息提供者）角色的初步实地研究，提供了与开放式创新过程相关的各种问题可以从交易成本经济学的角度进行分析的见解。在开放式创新的背景下，交易成本有两种类型；这些是“与寻找对应物有关的费用”和“与内部协调有关的费用”。我们以日本制造业上市公司为对象进行了一项调查研究，以大样本来检验这一观点。该调查被发送到世界各地的企业研究中心。我们在公司总部询问了与“向外部销售技术”和“从外部购买技术”相关的问题，在领域中询问了与“从外部购买技术”相关的问题。通过大样本调查研究，我们得到了以下结论：当有一个组织单位的角色是寻找对应物时，“向外部销售技术”和“从外部购买技术”都更容易被观察到。我们的解释是，这是因为这些组织单位有效地降低了搜索成本。相反，与内部协调有关的费用因交易类型和组织结构类型而异。(2)当公司的领域数量增加时，“向外出售技术”的可能性降低。这是因为企业研究中心所开发的技术的“出售或使用”决策需要与领域进行协调，而协调成本随着领域数量的增加而增加。与这一发现相一致的是，当存在分散的管理控制系统且领域权力相对较强时，“向外出售技术”会减少。当存在促进领域间技术信息共享的机制时，这种类型的协调成本变得不那么具有决定性，更有可能发生“向外出售技术”。另一方面，当企业研发中心实力较强时，更容易出现“向外销售技术”的技术推动型。(3)当领域数量增加时，“从外部购买技术”更有可能发生。反映领域需求的“从外部购买技术”的需求拉动型，在领域权力相对较强的分散管理控制体制下更容易发生。(4)这影响了“从外部购买技术”的领域。在管理控制体系分散化程度较高的情况下，域内“从外部购买技术”的可能性较低。少