Research on Corporate Strategy and Management Control for Open Innovation

我们在日本、硅谷和大伦敦进行的关于联合研究、技术联盟、技术信息提供商等第三方角色的初步实地研究，提供了可以从交易成本经济学的角度分析与开放创新过程相关的各种问题的见解。在开放式创新的背景下，有两种类型的交易成本：“与寻找对手相关的成本”和“与内部协调相关的成本”。我们针对日本的制造业上市公司进行了一项调查研究，以大样本检验这一视角。这项调查被发送到企业研究中心和领域。我们询问了与公司总部的“向外出售技术”和“从外部购买技术”相关的问题，以及与在域中“从外部购买技术”相关的问题。通过大样本调查研究，我们得到了以下研究结果。(…)更多的1)当有一个组织单位的角色是寻找对应者时，更有可能观察到“向外出售技术”和“从外部购买技术”。我们的解释是，这是因为这些组织单位总体上有效地降低了搜索成本。相反，与内部协调有关的费用因交易类型和组织结构类型而异。(2)随着公司域名数量的增加，“对外卖技术”的可能性降低。这是因为，关于公司研究中心开发的技术的“出售或使用”决策需要与域进行协调，而协调成本随域的数量增加而增加。与这一发现一致的是，当存在领域力量相对较强的分散式管控系统时，技术对外销售减少。这种类型的协调成本变得不那么具有决定性，当存在促进域间共享技术信息的机制时，更有可能发生“向外出售技术”。另一方面，当企业研究中心拥有相对较强的实力时，更有可能发生技术推进型的“对外卖技术”。(3)域名越多，越容易发生技术外购。在域名权力相对较强的分散化管控体系下，更容易出现反映域名需求的需求拉动型外购技术。(4)这影响了域名的“从外部购买技术”。当管理控制系统更加分散时，在领域内“从外部购买技术”发生的可能性较小。较少

Initial field research concerned with joint research, technology alliances, roles of third party such as technology information providers, that we conducted in Japan, Silicon Valley, and greater London, provided insights that various issues related to open innovation processes can be analyzed from a transaction cost economics perspective. In the context of open innovation, there are two types of transaction costs; those "costs associated with searching for counterpart" and those "costs associated with internal coordination". We conducted a survey research targeted at listed manufacturing companies in Japan to examine this perspective with a large sample. The survey was sent out to corporate research centers that and domains. We questioned issues related to "selling technology to outside" and "buying technology from outside" at corporate head quarter, and those related to "buying technology from outside" at domains. We obtained following findings from the large sample survey research. ( … More 1) Both "selling technology to outside" and "buying technology from outside" are more likely to be observed when there is an organizational unit whose role is to search counterpart. We interpret that this is because those organizational units effectively decrease search cost in general. On the contrary, costs associated with internal coordination differ by types of transactions and by types of organizational structures. (2) "Selling technology to outside" is less likely to happen when the number of domains in a company increases. This is because "sell or use" decision concerning the technology developed at corporate research centers requires coordination with domains, and the coordination costs increase as the number of domain increases. Consistent with this finding, "selling technology to outside" decreases when there is decentralized management control system where power of domain is relatively strong. This type of coordination costs become less decisive and it is more likely to occur that "selling technology to outside" when there exist mechanisms that facilitate sharing technological information among domains. On the other hand, it is more likely to happen that the technology push type of "selling technology to outside" when corporate research centers have relatively strong power. (3) "Buying technology from outside" is more likely to happen when the number of domains increases. The need-pull type of "buying technology from outside", which reflect needs of domains, is more likely to happen when there is decentralized management control system where domain has relatively strong power. (4) This affects "buying technology from outside" at domains. "Buying technology from outside" at domains is less likely to happen when management control system is more decentralized. Less