Transformation of the Concept of "Reason" in Phenomenology : Husserl and Levinas

胡塞尔的“理性”概念将我们的话语理性追溯到一种作为“证据”的直觉理性。在这种“还原”的基础上，胡塞尔尖锐地提出了关于思维的“尺度”和“根据”的问题，从而导致现象学的“自我”和“伦理”转向。胡塞尔的“原始我”和“现象化我”概念，以及“我”所承载的“责任”概念，为我们从现象学的角度理解列维纳斯的“主体性”和“理性”思想提供了线索。列维纳斯提出的“理性”概念可以解释为这样一个伦理概念，它意味着从认知理性的自我陶醉中“觉醒”。

Husserl's concept of "reason" traces our discursive reason back to a kind of intuitive reason as "evidence". On the basis of such a "reduction" Husserl sharpens the question about "measure" and "ground" of thinking, which consequently brings about an "egological" and "ethical" turn in phenomenology. Husserl's concept of "primal I" and "phenomenologizing I" as well as that of "responsibility" carried by such an "I" provide a clue to understanding Levinas's thought of "subjectivity" and "reason" in a phenomenological way. The concept of "reason" proposed by Levinas can be interpreted as such an ethical one that signifies "awakening" from self-intoxication of cognitive reason.