Market Design in Dynamic Models

在这个项目中，我基于博弈论和信息经济学分析了激励问题在各种动态模型中的作用。具体来说，我提出了一种新的方法来解决多代理之间动态竞争的最优设计问题，例如组织中持续时间较长的促销竞赛。对日本花卉市场的顺序拍卖进行了理论分析，并对具有持续性的动态道德风险问题进行了新的研究。

In this project, I analyzed the role of incentive problems in various dynamic models based on game theory and economics of information. Specifically, I present a new approach for the optimal design problem of dynamic competition between multiple agents, such as promotion contests in an organization which lasts for long periods. Also I conducted theoretical analyses on the sequential auction in Japanese flower markets as well as a new effect in dynamic moral hazard problems with persistence.