Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in Japan

过去，主要银行在监督日本企业方面发挥着最重要的作用。然而，自20世纪90年代末以来，随着主银行体系的弱化，机构投资者在日本公司治理中的作用日益活跃。本研究分析了与机构投资者相关的经济成本和收益，并对日本企业的基金收购和股东提案进行了实证研究。实证结果，在一般情况下，提供了积极的证据表明，股东积极性进行的基金可以减轻管理防御，从而提高公司价值。与此同时，基金可能有自己的治理问题。案例研究和经济分析表明，较重的惩罚比更严格的基金披露要求更有效。

Main banks used to play the most important role in monitoring Japanese companies. However, as main banking system began to weaken since the late 1990s, institutional investors are becoming active in the Japanese corporate governance. This research project analyzed the economic costs and benefits associated with institutional investors, followed by empirical studies on buyouts and shareholder proposals undertaken by funds in corporate Japanese. The empirical results, in general, provide positive evidence that shareholder activism undertaken by funds can mitigate managerial entrenchment and therefore enhance firm value. In the same time, funds may have their own governance problems. Case studies and economic analysis suggest that heavier punishment is more effective than stricter disclosure requirements for funds.