Communism and the cult of the leader 1917-64

斯大林统治下的共产主义的一个显著特征是对领袖的崇拜。在苏联内部，对斯大林的崇拜和对列宁的开国崇拜就是例证，而列宁正是从崇拜中获得了所谓的合法性。然而，共产主义也是一场规模空前、凝聚力空前的国际政治运动，苏联宗教习俗的输出为集中控制的文化提供了代表和强化。当这些做法在冷战时期的“高度斯大林主义”达到顶峰时，模仿邪教几乎存在于每个共产党中，以斯大林本人为顶峰的明显的国际等级制度。在共产党掌权的国家中，领袖崇拜现象已经产生了广泛的跨学科文献，为进一步的研究开辟了富有成效的方向。然而，迄今为止，在非执政的共产党内部，还没有关于领袖崇拜的起源、运作和接受的一般或比较研究。本研究提供了这样一个研究。它的时间跨度从1917年到1964年，一方面是俄国革命和共产国际的建立，另一方面是去核化和“斯大林一代”共产主义领导人的去世。它的比较方法延伸到欧洲和北美的共产党，而共产主义现象的领袖崇拜本身是在更广泛的比较背景下考虑的。在这一框架下，英国和法国的共产党受到了更密切的关注。这些机构一般都是合法的公共机构，它们以各种形式提供了大量的邪教文件，从诗歌和游行到模范生活，以及共产党会议的仪式和礼仪。就像哈利·波利特（Harry Pollitt）和莫里斯·托雷兹（Maurice Thorez）等国内领袖崇拜的例子一样，国际崇拜也可以通过他们在不同政治环境中的输出和调解来重建。除了对列宁和斯大林的狂热崇拜外，这项研究还考察了更广泛的国际知名领导人。革命保卫者或殉道者的形象可以追溯到国会大火审判的英雄格奥尔基·季米特洛夫和被监禁的德国领导人恩斯特Thälmann。尽管表达方式截然不同，但这些邪教的共同点是它们的男性主义结构。因此，西班牙共产党领导人帕西奥纳里亚的特殊国际地位也受到密切关注。领袖崇拜的产生和推广被视为斯大林个人领导模式的直接复制和传播。然而，这项研究表明，他们的许可是一个矛盾和相当紧张的问题。作为集体权威的一种表达，个人崇拜通过个人政治资本的积累威胁着集体权威。这当然得到了解决：通过模范党的反个人主义生活，或者通过明确而明确地服从对斯大林的更高崇拜。然而，小邪教的现象可以与苏联的“小斯大林”进行比较。领导层的危机有时也会出现，党的集体力量经常被用来反对“反邪教”，这些“反邪教”是对叛国者或背叛者个人形象的诅咒。历史学家认为，在更开放的政治体制中，领袖崇拜和对领袖的崇拜之间存在着基本的区别。在“开放”体制中，“封闭”政党的运作可能有助于澄清这种区别，并对这种区别提出问题，并为大众政治领袖的“现代”现象提供新的见解。在对现代人格文化的研究不断扩大的背景下，对共产主义领袖崇拜的研究为个性化叙事与大众自吹自擂的时代之间的关系提供了新的视角。

A defining feature of communism under Stalin was the cult of the leader. Within the USSR this was exemplified by Stalin's own cult, and by the founding cult of Lenin from which it derived its claimed legitimacy. Communism, however, was also an international political movement of unprecedented scope and cohesion, for which the export of Soviet cultic practices provided representation and reinforcement of a culture of centralised control. By the time these practices reached their apogee in the Cold War years of 'high Stalinism', mimetic cults existed in almost every communist party, with a clearly marked international hierarchy culminating in Stalin himself. The leader cult phenomenon, as manifested in countries where communists held power, has given rise to a wide inter-disciplinary literature opening up fruitful lines for further research. As yet, however, there exists no general or comparative study of the genesis, functioning and reception of the leader cults within non-ruling communist parties. This research provides such a study. Covering the period of 1917-64, its chronological scope is set on the one hand by the Russian revolution and founding of the Communist International, and on the other by destalinisation and the passing of a 'Stalin generation' of communist leaders. Its comparative approach extends across the communist parties of Europe and north America, and the communist phenomenon of the leader cult is itself considered in a broader comparative context. Incorporated within this framework is a more intensive focus on the communist parties of Britain and France. These were generally legal, public bodies and they offer extensive documentation of the cults in their diverse representations, from poetry and pageant to exemplary lives and the rituals and protocols of communist meetings. As well as examples of the domestic leader cult in the shape of Harry Pollitt and Maurice Thorez, international cults can be reconstructed through their export and mediation within distinct political milieux. As well as the defining cults of Lenin and Stalin, the research examines a broader cast of internationally prominent leaders. The figure of revolutionary tribune or martyr is traced through Georgi Dimitrov, hero of the Reichstag fire trial, and the imprisoned German leader Ernst Thälmann. Though articulated in strikingly different ways, a commonality of the cults was their masculinist construction. For this reason, the exceptional international standing of the Spanish communist leader Pasionaria' is also given close attention.The generation and promotion of the leader cults has been seen as a straightforward replication and transmission of Stalin's personalised leadership model. This research, however, suggests that their licensing of was a matter of paradox and considerable tension. Intended as an expression of collective authority, individualised cults threatened it through the accumulation of personal political capital. This was certainly addressed: through the anti-individualism of exemplary party lives, or though clear and explicit subordination to the higher cult of Stalin. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of the lesser cults may be compared with that of the 'little Stalins' in the USSR. Leadership crises sometimes resulted, and the party's collective force was regularly turned against the 'anti-cults' by which the individualised figure of the traitor or backslider was anathematised.Historians have postulated a basic distinction between leader cults proper and the glorification of leaders in more open polities The functioning of 'closed' parties within 'open' systems may help clarify and problematise such distinctions and offer new insight into the 'modern' phenomenon of the mass political leader. Within the expanding literature on the modern culture of personality, study of the communist leader cult offers new perspective on the relations between narratives of individuation and the vaunted age of the masses.