Currency and Fiscal Policy Options for an independent Scotland

独立苏格兰的货币和财政政策选择

• 批准号: ES/K007181/1
• 负责人: Angus Armstrong
• 金额: $ 33.24万
• 依托单位: National Institute of Economic and Social Research
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Fellowship
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2013 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FK007181%2F1
• 关键词: Currency; Fiscal; Policy; Options; independent

SUMMARYThe objective of this Fellowship is to stimulate an open and informed debate on the coherence of alternative currency and fiscal arrangements for Scotland. This issue is at the heart of whether full or further devolution will be successful. Since independence is likely to be irreversible, at least for several years, an informed debate requires understanding all of the currency and fiscal options across a spectrum of sovereignty rights, whether or not they are part of a referendum. Scotland's future currency and fiscal arrangement is at the heart of whether full or further devolution will be successful. The Parliament of Great Britain with full currency, fiscal and political union began with the Acts of Union in 1707 and has endured longer that all other monetary unions between nations. Monetary unions which have logical inconsistencies have always been eventually exposed by an unforeseeable economic shock. History is replete with instances in which failed unions lead not only to economic crises but often political division. The academic community has a responsibility to propose currency and fiscal arrangements which have integrity and be unapologetic in highlighting those which are inconsistent.The current economic crisis shows how failure to understand risks and misaligned incentives in the financial system can undermine policy frameworks. The number of financial crises around the world over the last three decades, and in particular the recent global crisis, shows how private sector risks can become public sector liabilities as the state remains the ultimate insurer of systemic risk. With the large transfer of financial sector exposures to the public sector the previous working assumption of a division between currency (or monetary) policy and fiscal policy has become exposed as an over-simplification.The traditional approach of an optimal currency area developed in the 1960s must be extended to include financial sector risks. Only when financial sector risks are fully incorporated can the integrity of the new currency and fiscal arrangements be judged. This Fellowship aims to make this extension. The liabilities of the banking system are assumed to be contingent fiscal risks of the state. This brings financial supervision and non-monetary policies (i.e. bank support policies) by the central bank into the centre of the debate. This creates a clear link between monetary and fiscal policies. These risks are central to Scotland - a small and open economy with a large financial sector. Failure to consider currency, fiscal and financial arrangements together would be a serious omission in this debate.This Fellowship will examine Scotland's currency and fiscal policy options from a joint macro-economic and macro-financial perspective. The macro-economic perspective looks at the structure of an independent Scottish economy (more oil-based and without the Barnett fiscal transfer) and fiscal sustainability. The core of the Fellowship is building the first large-scale global econometric model of Scotland. This will be an extension of NIESR's National Institute Global Economic Model (NiGEM) which has over 40 model subscribers, mainly in the policy community, including the Bank of England, the FSA, the ECB, the OECD, the IMF. The macro-financial perspective will focus on the Scottish banking system as a state contingent liability. The key issues are what are the choices of institutional arrangements for providing financial sector support (such as lender of last resort and deposit insurance) and who will be the regulator. While it is possible to contract-out these operations, this will involve a fiscal cost and raise moral hazard issues.

本奖学金的目的是激发关于苏格兰替代货币和财政安排的一致性的公开和知情的辩论。这一问题是全面或进一步权力下放能否成功的核心。由于独立可能是不可逆转的，至少在几年内是不可逆转的，因此一场知情的辩论需要了解一系列主权权利的所有货币和财政选择，无论它们是否是全民投票的一部分。苏格兰未来的货币和财政安排是全面或进一步权力下放能否成功的核心。1707年，英国议会通过了《联合法案》，建立了全面的货币、财政和政治联盟，比其他国家之间的货币联盟持续时间更长。具有逻辑不一致性的货币联盟最终总是会被不可预见的经济冲击所暴露。历史上充满了失败的工会不仅导致经济危机，而且往往导致政治分裂的例子。学术界有责任提出具有完整性的货币和财政安排，并毫无歉意地强调那些不一致的安排。当前的经济危机表明，不理解金融体系中的风险和不一致的激励措施会如何破坏政策框架。过去30年来，世界各地发生的金融危机数量，特别是最近的全球危机，表明私营部门的风险如何成为公共部门的负债，因为国家仍然是系统性风险的最终保险人。随着金融部门的风险大量转移到公共部门，以前将货币（或货币）政策与财政政策分开的工作假设已变得过于简单化，1960年代制定的最佳货币区的传统方法必须扩展到包括金融部门风险。只有在充分考虑到金融部门风险的情况下，才能判断新货币和财政安排的完整性。本奖学金旨在使这一扩展。银行系统的负债被假定为国家的或有财政风险。这使中央银行的金融监督和非货币政策（即银行支持政策）成为辩论的中心。这在货币政策和财政政策之间建立了明确的联系。这些风险是苏格兰的核心--苏格兰是一个小型开放的经济体，拥有庞大的金融部门。如果不同时考虑货币、财政和金融安排，将是本次辩论中的一个严重遗漏。本奖学金将从宏观经济和宏观金融的角度共同研究苏格兰的货币和财政政策选择。宏观经济视角着眼于独立的苏格兰经济结构（更多地以石油为基础，没有巴内特财政转移）和财政可持续性。该研究金的核心是建立苏格兰的第一个大规模全球计量经济学模型。这将是NIESR的国家研究所全球经济模型（NiGEM）的扩展，该模型拥有40多个模型用户，主要来自政策界，包括英格兰银行，FSA，ECB，OECD和IMF。宏观金融视角将侧重于苏格兰银行系统作为国家或有负债。关键的问题是选择何种体制安排来提供金融部门支助（例如最后贷款人和存款保险）以及谁将担任监管者。虽然可以将这些业务外包，但这将涉及财政成本并引发道德风险问题。