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Religion and Right-wing Populism in Western Europe and North America in the 21st century

21世纪西欧和北美的宗教与右翼民粹主义

基本信息

批准号：
1964014
负责人：
金额：
--
依托单位：
University of Cambridge
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Studentship
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2017 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-1964014
关键词：
Religion Right wing Populism Western

项目摘要

From the carrying of crosses and the singing of hymns at rallies to a new rhetoric centred on the defence of "the Christian occident" against "radical Islam" and "godless Liberalism": National populists on both sides of the Atlantic are making increasing use of Christian symbols and language. Many observers are quick to take such behaviour at face value and resurrect concepts like the "Clash of Civilisation" or new "Culture Wars" between Christianity, Islam and Secularism. On closer inspection, however, the relationship between the new right and Christianity is much more nuanced. In the U.S. for instance, Donald Trump is perceived to be the least religious GOP candidate in recent history and has been met with significant opposition from evangelical clergy. In Europe supporters of right-wing populism tend to be dis-proportionally irreligious, and Church attendance remains a strong predictor for not voting right-wing populist. This dissertation seeks to comprehend this ambiguous relationship by exploring right-wing populists' motives to employ religion and religious communities' responses. Drawing on exclusive elite interviews with national populist leaders, senior Church officials and competitor party representatives, it finds that national populist movements chiefly employ Christian symbols and language as a cultural identity marker in order to mobilise voters around new identity cleavages that are replacing traditional class, economic or moral cleavages. However, doing so they often remain distanced from Christian doctrine and instead seek to combine Christian identity markers with secular policy stances, suggesting a secularisation of Christian symbols and a loss of the Church(es)' religious authority rather than a resurgence of religion in western societies.

从在集会上背十字架和唱圣歌，到以捍卫“基督教西方”为中心的新言论，反对“激进伊斯兰”和“无神论自由主义”：大西洋两岸的民族民粹主义者正在越来越多地使用基督教的符号和语言。许多观察家很快就从表面上理解了这种行为，并重新提出了“文明冲突”或基督教、伊斯兰教和世俗主义之间新的“文化战争”等概念。然而，仔细观察就会发现，新右翼和基督教之间的关系要微妙得多。以美国为例，唐纳德·特朗普被认为是近年来最不信教的共和党候选人，他遭到了福音派神职人员的强烈反对。在欧洲，右翼民粹主义的支持者往往不成比例地不信教，去教堂做礼拜仍然是不投票给右翼民粹主义的一个强有力的预测指标。本文试图通过探讨右翼民粹主义者利用宗教的动机和宗教团体的反应来理解这种模棱两可的关系。通过对民族民粹主义领导人、高级教会官员和竞争对手政党代表的独家精英采访，该研究发现，民族民粹主义运动主要使用基督教符号和语言作为文化身份标记，以动员选民围绕新的身份分裂，取代传统的阶级、经济或道德分裂。然而，在这样做时，他们往往与基督教教义保持距离，而是寻求将基督教身份标志与世俗政策立场结合起来，这表明基督教符号的世俗化和教会宗教权威的丧失，而不是宗教在西方社会的复兴。