Analysing the Safety of Collision Avoidance Protocols in Aviation

自动驾驶和半自动驾驶汽车的防撞协议构成了安全可靠的全球交通系统的支柱。在航空方面，交通警报和防撞系统（TCAS）负责确保飞机的安全，减少空中碰撞的机会。然而，TCAS的安全性和有效性还有待于从安全的角度进行分析，特别是考虑到目前和不断增长的空中交通水平，关于近二十年前构思的协议。其目标是确定TCAS是否仍然满足其避碰方面的业务目标，并进一步调查它是否容易受到恶意攻击。我们的研究方法的新奇在于，我们使用真实世界的数据（飞机应答器信息）来分析TCAS的安全性，而不是依赖于模拟或统计测试。这使我们能够收集有关全球TCAS使用情况的准确和最新信息。根据我们的研究结果，我们处于一个独特的位置，可以了解TCAS带来的潜在风险，它们带来的后果，以及最重要的-可能的补救方法。该项目福尔斯EPSRC“全球无障碍”研究领域，更具体地说，属于该类别下的“网络安全”核心研究主题。

Collision avoidance protocols for autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles form the backbone of a safe and reliable global transportation system. In the case of aviation, the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is responsible for ensuring the safety of aircraft and reducing the chances of mid-air collisions. However the safety and efficacy of TCAS is yet to be analysed from a security perspective-especially given the current and ever-increasing levels of air-traffic with regard to a protocol conceived nearly two decades ago.This research project aims to model and analyse the constraints specified by TCAS that are required for safe operation. The goal is to determine whether TCAS still meets its operational goals with regard to collision avoidance, and further investigate whether it is vulnerable to malicious attack. The novelty of our research methodology is that we use real-world data (aircraft transponder messages) for our analysis of TCAS's safety, rather than relying on simulations or statistical testing. This allows us to glean accurate and up-to-date information regarding the usage of TCAS around the world. Based on our results, we are then in a unique position to understand the potential risks posed by TCAS, the consequences posed by them, and most importantly - possible methods of remedying them. This project falls within the EPSRC "Global Uncertainties" research area, and more specifically within the "Cyber-Security" core research theme under this category.