Semantic plasticity in relation to the vagueness debate

与模糊性争论相关的语义可塑性

• 批准号: 2125866
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Leeds
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2018 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2125866
• 关键词: Semantic; plasticity; relation; vagueness; debate

1 Research Question Many of our words are "semantically plastic". This feature can explain puzzling phenomena such as our ignorance in borderline cases of vagueness. But recent work suggests it also generates a new argument for scepticism. This thesis will be the first sustained examination of semantic plasticity (SP) and its implications. 2 Research Context Many words (e.g. "salad") undergo shifts in meaning. One way this can happen is if the meaning of such words is constantly changing in minor ways that add up, over the long term, to a major shift. Let a word be semantically plastic if: a. small differences in the word's usage result in a shift in its semantic value (roughly, its meaning); and b. speakers cannot detect these small differences.SP has been used to provide theoretically-neutral explanations of puzzling phenomena. A basic fact about vague predicates (e.g. "bald") is that we cannot knowingly identify a cut-off between the bald and the not bald, but what explains this ignorance? SP for "bald" implies that even if I had a true belief, say, that "bald" picks out people with 2,178 hairs or less, the belief could easily be false, since usage could easily be slightly and undetectably different. Knowledge requires a belief that is safely true, so semantic plasticity predicts ignorance in such cases.However, SP threatens the safety of many of our basic beliefs. For instance, due to semantic plasticity of "person", the belief expressed by "I am a person" is not safe. Say that in a close possible world, "person" doesn't pick out me but picks out an object O that overlaps me. Then "I am a person" uttered by me at that world is false as "I" picks out me and "person" picks out O, but I am distinct from O.We have independent reason to believe that many words satisfy SP, and it is central to one of the leading theories of vagueness. Despite this the literature directly engaging with these issues is small and the puzzles have been growing faster than satisfying responses. Hawthorne (2006) presents the problem that SP poses for safety of beliefs involving 'person' and 'true'. Sennet (2012) and Kearns 8 Magidor (2008) argue that SP presents a problem for the epistemicist account of vagueness. Manley (MS) shows that semantic plasticity of moral terms conflicts with intuitions favouring moral realism. Hawthorne and Dorr (2014) argue that SP poses a problem for counterfactual and cross-temporal speech reports. 3 Research Approach The overarching aim of my project will be to work out a conception of semantic plasticity that avoids scepticism about basic beliefs and still allows us to deal with vagueness. In working out this conception, I shall do the following: Chapter 1. Provide an analysis of why there is semantic plasticity. My hypothesis is that semantic plasticity arises also if we don't accept the thesis from Williamson (1994) that meaning supervenes on use of all speakers in the community. I shall also analyse the connection between SP and semantic holism. The most popular argument against semantic holism is that holistic meaning is unstable. My intuition is that the instability of holistic meaning is actually due to SP.Chapter 2. Connect SP and vagueness. SP is said to pose problems for the view of vagueness which preserves classical logic (epistemicism). My hypothesis is that problems arise due to SP will also arise on non-classical treatments of vagueness.Chapter 3. SP and metasemantics. I shall investigate whether reference magnetism can be invoked to stabilise the shiftiness of meaning due to SP in problematic cases. I will investigate the hypothesis that recent developments of the metaphysically deflationary reference magnetism by Williams (forthcoming) make such solutions appealing. I will also connect SP with indeterminacy of translation: my intuition is that some innocently-looking solutions to problems posed by SP (e.g. presented in Hawthorne (2006)) run into problems with indeterminacy of translation.

我们的许多词汇都具有“语义可塑性”。这一特征可以解释一些令人困惑的现象，比如我们在模糊的边缘情况下的无知。但最近的研究表明，它也为怀疑论提供了新的论据。本文将是语义可塑性（SP）及其意义的第一次持续研究。许多单词(例如：“沙拉”)在意义上发生变化。这种情况发生的一种方式是，如果这些词的意思不断地在细微的方面发生变化，这些变化加起来，长期来看，会产生重大变化。让一个词在语义上具有可塑性，如果：a.这个词的用法的微小差异会导致其语义价值（粗略地说，它的意义）的变化；b.说话者无法察觉这些细微的差别。SP已被用来为令人困惑的现象提供理论中立的解释。关于模糊谓词的基本事实(例如：“秃顶”)是我们不能有意识地识别秃顶和非秃顶之间的界限，但如何解释这种无知呢？SP表示“秃顶”意味着，即使我有一个正确的信念，比如，“秃顶”指的是2178根头发或更少的人，这个信念很可能是错误的，因为用法很容易出现细微的、无法察觉的差异。知识需要一种绝对正确的信念，因此在这种情况下，语义可塑性预示着无知。然而，SP威胁到我们许多基本信仰的安全。例如，由于“人”的语义可塑性，“我是一个人”所表达的信念是不安全的。假设在一个相近的可能世界中，“人”不会挑出我，而是挑出一个与我重叠的物体。那么，我在那个世界所说的“我是一个人”是假的，因为“我”选择了我，“人”选择了O，但我与O是不同的。我们有独立的理由相信许多词满足SP，这是模糊的主要理论之一的核心。尽管如此，直接涉及这些问题的文献很少，谜题的增长速度快于令人满意的回应。霍桑（2006）提出了SP对涉及“人”和“真”的信念的安全性提出的问题。Sennet（2012）和Kearns 8 Magidor（2008）认为SP对模糊性的认识论解释提出了一个问题。Manley （MS）的研究表明，道德术语的语义可塑性与倾向于道德实在论的直觉相冲突。Hawthorne和Dorr（2014）认为SP对反事实和跨时间的言语报告提出了一个问题。我的项目的首要目标将是制定一个语义可塑性的概念，避免对基本信念的怀疑，仍然允许我们处理模糊性。在构思这一概念时，我将做以下工作：分析为什么存在语义可塑性。我的假设是，如果我们不接受Williamson（1994）的论文，即意义监督社区中所有说话者的使用，语义可塑性也会出现。我还将分析SP与语义整体论之间的联系。反对语义整体论的最流行的观点是，整体意义是不稳定的。我的直觉是，整体意义的不稳定实际上是由于SP.Chapter 2。把SP和模糊性联系起来。据说SP对保留经典逻辑（认识论）的模糊性观点提出了问题。我的假设是，由于SP而产生的问题也会出现在对模糊性的非经典治疗上。第三章。SP和元语义。我将研究在有问题的情况下，参考磁力是否可以被用来稳定由于SP而引起的意义的转移。我将研究这样一种假设，即威廉姆斯（Williams，即将出版）关于形而上学的通货紧缩参考磁力的最新发展，使这种解决方案具有吸引力。我还将SP与翻译的不确定性联系起来：我的直觉是，SP提出的一些看似无辜的解决方案（例如霍桑（2006）提出的）遇到了翻译的不确定性问题。