Semantic plasticity in relation to the vagueness debate

1研究问题我们的许多单词都是“语义可塑性”的。这一特征可以解释令人困惑的现象，比如我们在边缘情况下的无知。但最近的研究表明，这也为怀疑论提供了新的论据。本文是对语义可塑性及其意义的首次持续性研究。2研究背景许多单词（例如“salad”）的意思都发生了变化。发生这种情况的一种方式是，如果这些词的含义不断发生变化，从长远来看，会产生重大变化。假设一个词是语义可塑的，如果：a。该词用法上的微小差异导致其语义值（大致上，其含义）的变化;以及B.说话者不能察觉这些细微的差别。SP被用来对令人困惑的现象提供理论上中立的解释。关于模糊谓词（例如“bald”）的一个基本事实是，我们不能在知情的情况下识别bald和not bald之间的分界线，但如何解释这种无知呢？SP表示“bald”，这意味着即使我有一个真实的信念，比如说，“bald”指的是2,178根头发或更少的人，这个信念也很容易是错误的，因为用法很容易有细微的、不可察觉的不同。知识需要一个可靠的信念，因此语义可塑性预示着在这种情况下的无知。然而，SP威胁到我们许多基本信念的安全性。例如，由于“人”的语义可塑性，“我是一个人”所表达的信念是不安全的。假设在一个封闭的可能世界中，“人”并没有挑选出我，而是挑选出一个与我重叠的对象O，那么我在那个世界中说出的“我是一个人”是错误的，因为“我”挑选出了我，“人”挑选出了O，但我与O不同。我们有独立的理由相信，许多词满足SP，这是一个主要的共同性理论的核心。尽管如此，直接涉及这些问题的文献很少，困惑的增长速度快于令人满意的反应。霍桑（2006）提出了SP对涉及“人”和“真”的信念的安全性提出的问题。Sennet（2012）和Kearns 8 Magidor（2008）认为，SP为认识论对非理性的解释提出了一个问题。Manley（MS）指出，道德术语的语义可塑性与倾向于道德实在论的直觉相冲突。霍桑和多尔（2014）认为，SP提出了一个问题，反事实和跨时间的讲话报告。3研究方法我的项目的首要目标是制定出一个语义可塑性的概念，避免对基本信念的怀疑，仍然允许我们处理语义。在阐述这个概念时，我将做以下工作：第1章。分析为什么会有语义可塑性。我的假设是，如果我们不接受威廉姆森（1994）的论点，即意义随社会中所有说话者的使用而发生，语义可塑性也会出现。我还将分析SP和语义整体论之间的联系。反对语义整体论最流行的论点是整体意义是不稳定的。我的直觉是，整体意义的不稳定性实际上是由于SP.第2章。连接SP和网络。SP被说成是对保留古典逻辑（认识论）的一致性观点提出了问题。我的假设是，问题出现，由于SP也将出现在非经典治疗的共同性。第3章。SP和变质作用。我将调查是否可以调用参考磁性，以稳定由于SP在有问题的情况下，意义的移位。我将研究这样一个假设，即威廉姆斯（即将出版）提出的形而上学的通货紧缩参考磁性的最新发展使这种解决方案具有吸引力。我还将把SP与翻译的不确定性联系起来：我的直觉是，对SP提出的问题的一些看似无辜的解决方案（例如霍桑（2006）提出的）遇到了翻译的不确定性问题。

1 Research Question Many of our words are "semantically plastic". This feature can explain puzzling phenomena such as our ignorance in borderline cases of vagueness. But recent work suggests it also generates a new argument for scepticism. This thesis will be the first sustained examination of semantic plasticity (SP) and its implications. 2 Research Context Many words (e.g. "salad") undergo shifts in meaning. One way this can happen is if the meaning of such words is constantly changing in minor ways that add up, over the long term, to a major shift. Let a word be semantically plastic if: a. small differences in the word's usage result in a shift in its semantic value (roughly, its meaning); and b. speakers cannot detect these small differences.SP has been used to provide theoretically-neutral explanations of puzzling phenomena. A basic fact about vague predicates (e.g. "bald") is that we cannot knowingly identify a cut-off between the bald and the not bald, but what explains this ignorance? SP for "bald" implies that even if I had a true belief, say, that "bald" picks out people with 2,178 hairs or less, the belief could easily be false, since usage could easily be slightly and undetectably different. Knowledge requires a belief that is safely true, so semantic plasticity predicts ignorance in such cases.However, SP threatens the safety of many of our basic beliefs. For instance, due to semantic plasticity of "person", the belief expressed by "I am a person" is not safe. Say that in a close possible world, "person" doesn't pick out me but picks out an object O that overlaps me. Then "I am a person" uttered by me at that world is false as "I" picks out me and "person" picks out O, but I am distinct from O.We have independent reason to believe that many words satisfy SP, and it is central to one of the leading theories of vagueness. Despite this the literature directly engaging with these issues is small and the puzzles have been growing faster than satisfying responses. Hawthorne (2006) presents the problem that SP poses for safety of beliefs involving 'person' and 'true'. Sennet (2012) and Kearns 8 Magidor (2008) argue that SP presents a problem for the epistemicist account of vagueness. Manley (MS) shows that semantic plasticity of moral terms conflicts with intuitions favouring moral realism. Hawthorne and Dorr (2014) argue that SP poses a problem for counterfactual and cross-temporal speech reports. 3 Research Approach The overarching aim of my project will be to work out a conception of semantic plasticity that avoids scepticism about basic beliefs and still allows us to deal with vagueness. In working out this conception, I shall do the following: Chapter 1. Provide an analysis of why there is semantic plasticity. My hypothesis is that semantic plasticity arises also if we don't accept the thesis from Williamson (1994) that meaning supervenes on use of all speakers in the community. I shall also analyse the connection between SP and semantic holism. The most popular argument against semantic holism is that holistic meaning is unstable. My intuition is that the instability of holistic meaning is actually due to SP.Chapter 2. Connect SP and vagueness. SP is said to pose problems for the view of vagueness which preserves classical logic (epistemicism). My hypothesis is that problems arise due to SP will also arise on non-classical treatments of vagueness.Chapter 3. SP and metasemantics. I shall investigate whether reference magnetism can be invoked to stabilise the shiftiness of meaning due to SP in problematic cases. I will investigate the hypothesis that recent developments of the metaphysically deflationary reference magnetism by Williams (forthcoming) make such solutions appealing. I will also connect SP with indeterminacy of translation: my intuition is that some innocently-looking solutions to problems posed by SP (e.g. presented in Hawthorne (2006)) run into problems with indeterminacy of translation.