Secure online services for private user data

当用户被要求或选择向组织或政府实体披露私人/敏感数据以供处理时，必须在安全性和便利性之间取得平衡。在线提交通常是最方便的，但它也有很大的风险。本研究计划提出开发和部署创新的加密协议，以提供安全的在线选举系统和安全的在线基因测试。任何对安全至关重要的在线服务都必须至少向用户提供一个过程，以确定他们是否连接到目标方（服务器身份验证），然后提供一个保密的通信通道。当用户访问以https://开头的网站时（浏览器会显示锁），这些属性就会出现，然而，信任假设和该协议（称为SSL/TLS）所依赖的基础设施最近受到了质疑。

When users are required to, or opt to, disclose private/sensitive data to an organization or government entity for processing, a balance must be struck between security and convenience. Online submission is often the most convenient but it also carries substantial risks. This research program proposes the development and deployment of innovative cryptographic protocols for providing secure online election systems and secure online genetic testing. Any security-critical online service must at least provide users with a process for determining they are connected to the intended party (server authentication) and then provide a confidential communication channel. These properties are intended when a user visits a website beginning with https:// (and the browser displays a lock), however, the trust assumptions and infrastructure this protocol (called SSL/TLS) relies on have been recently questioned. The research program will proceed in three thrusts: one toward improving the SSL/TLS infrastructure, one toward advancing beyond basic SSL/TLS protection for the specific application of online voting, and one that does the same for online genetic tests. When users visit a website over https://, the site provides a certificate of their identity, endorsed by a business or organization called a Certificate Authority (CA). Any CA can issue a certificate for any site. The number of CAs has proliferated, the baseline criteria for validation has declined, and high profile breeches of CAs have been publicly disclosed. This research program will design, implement, and test alternative mechanisms for certification. Online voting has been used municipally across Canada, is to be piloted federally by Elections Canada, and is being deliberated on by some provinces. Unlike online banking, where an incorrect, mistaken, or fraudulent transaction can be seen by the user, ballot secrecy mandates that individual votes cannot be displayed (which would enable vote selling). This research program will design, implement and test novel end-to-end verifiable (E2E) voting systems that provide a provably correct tally while maintaining the secrecy of each voter's ballot, even if the voter is complicit in demonstrating how they voted or uses a malware-infected personal computer to cast their ballot. The decreasing cost of whole genome sequencing has the potential to revolutionize healthcare, allowing genetic tests and personalized medicine. However, your genome is private information. Once it is disclosed or leaked, the privacy can never be recovered. This research program will design, implement and test novel cryptographic protocols for allowing these tests to be performed on an encrypted genome, while offering proof that the test was performed correctly (even if some aspects of the test remain confidential). The results of this research program should be informative and useful to government election agencies, privacy commissioners, standards institutes, internet working groups, other cryptography, security and privacy researchers, and to the elections and healthcare industry. It will further equip a set of security professionals with the skills required to work or consult in any of these areas, and to apply their knowledge and experience to novel domains.