Dynamic Games, Reputation, and the Theory of the Firm

这是一项开创性的研究，已经重塑和推进了信息经济学、金融学、决策理论、博弈论和产业组织理论。例如，在之前的资助下，研究者开发了一个现在人人都在使用的顺序均衡的概念框架；开创了信号理论的一个重要分支；定义了一种代表大量对手之间讨价还价的新方式；并获得了许多关于声誉影响商业行为的微妙但重要的见解。新的支持允许研究者在这些领域追求一个雄心勃勃的研究议程。具体而言，议程包括：(1)研究拥有声誉的一方不受完善监督的声誉模式；(2)调查在这样的模型中，无法验证但有用的信息是否有可能完全不被利用；(3)进一步研究组织作为声誉承担者，重点关注多个参与方同时共享和影响声誉的模型；(4)发展具有不可预见偶然性的动态选择模型，利用这些模型研究动态双边关系，并将这些模型与新古典动态选择模型进行比较。

This is pathbreaking research that has already reshaped and advanced the economics of information, finance, decision theory, game theory and industrial organization theory. For example, under the previous grant the investigator developed a conceptual framework for sequential equilibria which everyone now uses; launched a major new branch of signalling theory; defined a new way of representing bargaining among a large number of opponents; and obtained many subtle but important insights into the way reputation affects business behavior. Renewed support permits the investigator to pursue an ambitious research agenda in these areas. Specifically, the agenda includes (1) the study of models of reputation where the party holding the reputation is not subject to perfect monitoring; (2) investigation of whether in such models, it is possible that unverifiable but useful information will go entirely unused; (3) further study of organizations as reputation bearers, focusing on models where a number of parties share and affect a reputation contemporaneously; and (4) the development of models of dynamic choice with unforeseen contingencies, the use of these models to study dynamic bilateral relationships, and a comparison of those models with neoclassical models of dynamic choice.