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Dividends and Corporate Financial Policy

Dividends and Corporate Financial Policy
股息和公司财务政策
批准号:
8821666
负责人:
Douglas Bernheim
金额:
$12.02万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1989
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1989-06-01 至 1991-11-30

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中文摘要
翻译
这项研究由几个项目组成,旨在解决有关公司股利政策的两个难题。第一个问题是,公司到底为什么要分红。以往的研究大多分为两类。一种解释股息是信息不对称的结果,而另一种则强调投资者异质性的后果。对这两种解释都提出了反对意见。本项目旨在修正和检验这两种理论,同时考虑到当前的批评。第二个谜题是,为什么股息支付如此顺利。我们认为,股利平滑可以在信号模型的背景下得到解释。我们将探索在信号背景下自然产生集聚的前提,并解释股利的微观经济和时间序列属性。这部分研究将集中在信号均衡的改进以及这些改进在股利模型中的应用。这个项目很重要,因为它将提高我们对公司关于向股东分配现金的政策的理解。在这项工作的基础上,应该可以对股息支出随着时间推移而下降的可能性做出更可靠的判断。对于股利政策在多大程度上被用来向股东传达信息,这一分析也应该有相当大的帮助。此外,还将衡量股息税对公司财务政策信息性的影响。还将重点分析改变股息和公司股票回购的税收处理的各种税收建议的可取性。
英文摘要
This research consists of several projects that are designed to address two puzzles concerning corporate dividend policy. The first is why do companies pay dividends at all. Most of the previous research falls into two categories. One explains dividends as a consequence of information asymmetries, while the other emphasizes the consequences of investor heterogeneity. Objections have been raised to both types of explanations. This project is aimed at modifying and testing these two theories, taking into account the current criticisms. The second puzzle is why are dividend payments so smooth. It is suggested that dividend smoothing can be explained within the context of signaling models. The premise that bunching arises naturally in signaling contexts and explains the microeconomic, time-series properties of dividends will be explored. This part of the research will focus on refinements of signaling equilibria and applications of these refinements to models of dividends. This project is important because it will improve our understanding of corporate policies regarding cash distributions to shareholders. On the basis of this work, it should be possible to make more reliable judgments about the likelihood that dividend payouts will decline over time. The analysis should also shed considerable light on the extent to which dividend policy is used to communicate information to shareholders. In addition, the effect of dividend taxation on the informativeness of corporate financial policy will be measured. Attention will also be focused on analyzing the desirability of various tax proposals that alter the tax treatment of dividends and the repurchase of stock by corporations.
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Do Non-Choice Data Reveal Preferences?
  • 批准号:
    1156263
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 财政年份:
    2012
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  • 项目类别:
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  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $18.01万
  • 财政年份:
    2005
  • 负责人:
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国内基金
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  • 批准号:
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  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 批准年份:
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  • 负责人:
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