Strategic Learning in Games of Incomplete Information: Theory and Experiments

该项目涉及的理论和实验工作， 这个问题对于博弈论和 博弈论实验的评价。 所述问题被 讨论了学习和学习模式。 的 特别感兴趣的是当个体 对不同的对手玩同样的游戏。 理论 该项目的一部分将集中研究这些条件下， 在这种博弈中哪些个体会或不会收敛于纳什均衡 均衡 该项目的实验部分将继续 两类设计的组合，试图评估 策略学习理论和一些短视的 研究人员开发的学习模型。 的第一次设计 在不完全信息的情况下重复博弈 在固定的对手之间，而第二个涉及重复播放 不断变化的对手之间。 这些设计将使 研究人员明确地在动态中研究学习 框架.

This project involves theoretical and experimental work on a problem of great importance for game theory generally and for the evaluation of game-theoretic experiments. The problem to be addressed deals with learning and models of learning. Of particular interest is the learning which occurs when individuals play the same game against different opponents. The theoretical part of the project will focus on studying those conditions under which individuals do or do not converge in such games to the Nash equilibrium. The experimental portion of the project will pursue a combination of two classes of designs in an attempt to evaluate both the theory of strategic learning and some of the myopic learning models developed by the investigators. The first design involves repeated play of a game with incomplete information between fixed opponents, while the second involves repeated play between changing opponents. These designs will enable the investigators to study learning explicitly within a dynamic framework.