Formal Models of Parties and Committees

该奖项支持对国会委员会在决定国会立法结果方面所起作用的研究。立法学者早就意识到，国会委员会做出的决定很少在国会被推翻。然而，有些委员会比其他委员会受到更大的尊重。已经提出了许多解释来解释这种模式，尽管其中大多数都是推测性的和临时的。这项创新的研究试图建立在现有的对委员会会议成功的解释之上，通过发展一种正式的理论，该理论基于立法者是关注个人利益最大化的理性行为者的假设，但在这种情况下是由党的领导人指导的。该理论将通过第84届、第86届、第88届、第90届、第92届、第94届、第96届、第98届、第100届国会常任委员会报告的所有法案的详细立法史来验证。该项目完成后将有助于我们更好地了解影响个人为集体利益进行合作的立法进程的动态。这种对集体利益是如何在高度分散的国会环境中产生的理解对于制定更好的立法策略来应对其他集体利益问题如削减赤字和竞选资金改革是至关重要的。

This award supports research on the role that congressional committees play in determining the outcome of legislation on the floor of Congress. Legislative scholars have long been aware that the decisions made by congressional committees are rarely overturned on the floor of the Congress. However, some committees are accorded much greater deference than others. A number of explanations have been advanced to explain this pattern, though most of these are somewhat speculative and ad hoc. This innovative research attempts to build upon existing explanations of committee floor success by developing a formal theory based on the assumption that legislators are rational actors concerned with maximizing individual interest but guided by a central agent, in this case by party leaders. The theory will be tested using detailed legislative histories of all bills reported by standing committees in the 84th, 86th, 88th, 90th, 92nd, 94th 96th 98th and 100th Congresses. When completed this project will help us better understand the dynamics of the legislative process that influence individuals to cooperate for collective benefits. Such an understanding of how collective goods are produced in the highly decentralized environment which is Congress is essential for developing better legislative strategies to cope with other collective goods problems such as deficit reduction and campaign finance reform.