Targeting Exchange Rates: Theory and Evidence from the Recent Managed Float

政府经常通过偶尔干预影响浮动汇率的混合政策来瞄准宏观经济变量，如汇率和利率。例如，在最近实行的有管理的浮动汇率制度下，货币当局在大多数时候允许汇率由市场力量决定，只有在汇率明显偏离目标水平时才进行干预。因此，金融媒体经常报道，政府偶尔的干预似乎影响了私人市场交易者的预期，这些交易者可能从这些事件中面临资本收益和损失。如果是这样的话，资产价格应该反映出预期的目标利率干预。这个项目的目的是建立一个模型来分析政府干预的效果，以防止利率和汇率偏离目标水平。分析将显示，央行干预导致的偶尔资本利得或损失的感知威胁，可能会如何影响市场交易。该模型还将用于实证评估干预政策用于目标利率时的汇率行为。这项研究很重要，因为它将帮助我们更好地理解以汇率为目标的政策如何影响市场对这些政策的看法，以及这些看法如何反过来影响利率。

Governments frequently target macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates and interest rates through a mixed policy of occasional interventions affecting floating rates. Under the recent managed float, for example, monetary authorities allow exchange rates to be determined by market forces most the time, only to intervene as rates deviate significantly from target levels. Accordingly, it has been frequently reported in the financial press that occasional government intervention appears to influence expectations on the part of private market traders who face possible capital gains and loses from these events. If this is the case, asset prices should reflect expected interventions to target rates. The purpose of this project is to develop a model for analyzing the effects of government interventions that prevent movements in interest and exchange rates from targeted levels. The analysis will show how the perceived threat of occasional capital gains or losses induced by central bank interventions may influence market trading. The model will also be used to empirically evaluate the behavior of exchange rates when intervention policies are used to target rates. This research is important because it will help us better understand how policies of targeting exchange rates affect the market's perception of these policies and how these perceptions, in turn, affect rates.