Collaborative Research in Power and Unilateral Initiatives in Explicit Bargaining

该项目与SES 9117262合作。 这个项目继续并扩展了讨价还价的理论， 在以前的NSF赠款下研究的威慑。 理论测试 这里把双边威慑理论与 单方面的积极举措。 最重要的新想法 在测试中，各方之间的权力关系-在同等条件下- 双方都有很强的惩罚对方的能力 调解举措的成功与否。 扩展 理论在一系列实验室实验中得到检验， 双方讨价还价，交换报价和还价，同时也 有能力对对方征收惩罚性赔偿。 结果确定抽象的，一般条件下， 冲突各方可以在没有调解人干预的情况下进行调解。 调解员或仲裁员。

This project is collaborative with SES 9117262. This project continues and extends a theory of bargaining and deterrence studied under previous NSF grants. The theory tested here integrates theories of bilateral deterrence with those of unilateral positive initiatives. The most important new idea under test is that power relations between parties - in par- ticular, high ability of both parties to punish each other - condition the success of conciliatory initiatives. The extended theory is tested in a series of laboratory experiments in which parties bargain, exchanging offers and counteroffers, while also having the capability to levy punitive damage on each other. Results identify abstract, general conditions under which con- flicting parties can produce conciliation without intervention of mediators or arbitrators.