Democratic Controls over Tax Enforcement

过去最引人注目的政治发展之一 世纪一直是政府管制的扩张和 因此，"民事"执法机构对大多数 社会和经济生活领域。 过去三十年 特别是见证了范围的急剧增长， 政府机构的权威和规模， 对普通公民的执法活动，而不是对 罪犯和犯罪活动。 虽然监管研究 执法和行政司法也有所扩大 很快，我们的民事知识有相当大的差距， 执法与非警察执法行为 社. 特别是，本报告中提出的关键问题 项目是在多大程度上扩大胁迫活动 执法机构由民主政治控制 制度和原则。 该项目分析了强制性的程度， 联邦机构的执法权力由选举产生的 官员和民主原则。 该项目扩大了 包括民主原则的概念框架 效率和平等，甚至可能限制控制 民选官员对执法行动施加的压力， 公民 研究小组分析了 国税局（IRS）执法活动， 民主控制。 这将通过以下方式实现： 采访国税局的财务和考试官员 以及华盛顿的政治领导人和知识渊博的观察家， 纽约和加州。 研究人员将开发三种 州一级的数据库，包括：国税局审计活动， 1960 - 1980年审计类别;个人和公司审计共计 1960 - 1990年的活动;以及1975 - 1990年的IRS人员。 他们 将使用多个指标来调查总统选举的影响， 国会、州长和州立法官员， 国税局审计和人员。 他们将澄清概念， 措施，并探讨民主的影响 IRS审计的效率和平等原则， 人员的 最后，他们将比较执法生产 提高审计在改善税务合规方面的有效性的职能 随时间、状态和审计类而变化。 这项研究将提供一个广泛的分析IRS 执行，重点是政治控制的影响， 民主原则、组织约束和执行 有效地解释了执行的差异， 纳税人和纳税人在过去的三十年。

One of the most striking political developments of the past century has been the expansion of government regulation and the consequent intrusion of "civil" enforcement agencies into most areas of social and economic life. The past three decades in particular has witnessed a dramatic growth in the scope of authority and size of government agencies that focus coercive enforcement activities on normal citizens, rather than on criminals and criminal activities. While studies of regulatory enforcement and administrative justice have also expanded rapidly, there is a considerable gap in our knowledge of civil enforcement and the behavior of non-policement enforcement agencies. In particular, the critical question addressed in this project is the extent to which the expanded coercive activities of enforcement agencies are controlled by democratic political institutions and principles. This project analyzes the extent to which the coercive enforcement powers of federal agencies are controlled by elected officials and democratic principles. The project expands the conceptual framework to include the democratic principles of efficiency and equality, which may constrain even controls exerted by elected officials over enforcement actions against citizens. The research team analyzes the responsiveness of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement activities to democratic controls. This will be accomplished through interviews with Financial and Examination officials in the IRS and political leaders and knowledgeable observers in Washington, New York and California. The researchers will develop three state-level data bases consisting of: IRS audit activities by audit class for 1960-1980; total individual and corporate audit activities for 1960-1990; and, IRS personnel for 1975-1990. They will use multiple indicators to probe the impact of presidential, congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative officials on IRS audits and personnel. They will clarify the concepts, develop measures, and probe the impact of the democratic principles of efficiency and equality on IRS audits and personnel. Finally, they will compare enforcement production functions for effectiveness of audits in improving tax compliance over time, states, and audit classes. This research will provide an extensive analysis of IRS enforcement, focusing on the impact of political controls, democratic principles, organizationl constraints, and enforcement effectiveness in explaining the variance of enforcement across tates and taxpayer categories for the last three decades.