Strategic Information in Bargaining and Contracting

有许多模型描述了面对不确定结果时的讨价还价行为和冲突解决。本研究将使用实验室实验方法来评估在不完全合约的情况下，两种可供选择的议价模型的预测能力。最简单的形式是，在不完全合同的第一阶段，当不确定性得到解决时，各方首先进行某种形式的关系特定投资，以提高价值或降低第二阶段的成本。一旦知道了世界的状态，不完全契约的各方就会意识到剩余将被分配给参与者。议价分割剩余，完成合同。子博弈完全均衡议价假设预测议价产生的剩余分配独立于沉没成本，即在这种情况下，关系特定投资。另外，一个股权理论模型预测，当个人投资是可观察到的，讨价还价将按比例分配剩余与各方在总投资中的份额。当这些信息无法获得时，结果等同于完全均衡假设所预测的结果。这些替代性议价假设的预测能力将通过系统地改变议价者关于关系特定投资的信息来检验。此外，由于合同中的投资激励是由议价结果决定的，并且由于待检验的假设意味着不同的议价结果，本研究也将有助于我们理解议价行为与合同绩效之间的联系。

There are a number of models describing bargaining behavior and conflict resolution in the face of uncertain outcomes. This study will use laboratory experimental methods to evaluate the predictive capacity of two alternative models of bargaining in the context of an incomplete contract. In its most simple form, parties in the first stage of an incomplete contract first make some form of relationship-specific investment that enhances value or reduces costs in the second stage, when uncertainty is resolved. Once the state of the world is known, parties to the incomplete contract realize a surplus to be divided among participants. Bargaining divides surplus and completes the contract. The subgame perfect equilibrium bargaining hypothesis predicts that surplus divisions from bargaining are independent of sunk costs, i.e., in this case, relationship-specific investments. Alternatively, an equity-theoretic model predicts that bargaining will divide surplus proportionately with each party's share of total investment when individual investments are observable. When this information is not available, outcomes are equivalent to those predicted by the perfect equilibrium hypothesis. The predictive power of these alternative bargaining hypotheses will be tested by systematically varying bargainers' information on relationship-specific investments. Moreover, since investment incentives in contracts are determined by bargaining outcomes, and since the hypotheses to be tested imply different bargaining outcomes, this study will also contribute to our understanding of the linkage between bargaining behavior and contractual performance.