Political Economy, Collective Choice, Regulation, and Public Economics

[409559] Baron这个研究项目有四个部分。研究的第一部分涉及对信息层次结构的更完整的探索。信息层级包括公共层级，如国会、局、国家机构等，也包括私人层级，如经理、领班、总部等。所开发的模型解决了当前关于授权的争论。它着眼于在信息不完整且至少有一方无法观察到的情况下的承包和分包问题。研究的第二部分从顺序选择的角度发展了集体选择理论。它侧重于提供集体商品而不是特定商品。它试图将选民包括在模型中，并解决有关选民对集体商品计划的信息量的问题。研究报告的第三部分涉及利益集团及其在政策进程的选举和立法阶段的影响。研究的第四部分涉及使用权利支出数据对集体物品提供的顺序选择模型进行实证检验。这个项目非常有趣，因为它试图进一步发展一种相对新颖的方法来建模政治制度，整合政策的立法和选举决定因素，并提供对权利计划的性质和演变的见解。

9409559 Baron This research program has four parts. The first part of the study involves a more complete exploration of information hierarchies. Information hierarchies include public hierarchies, such as, Congress, bureau, state agency, etc. and private hierarchies, such as, manager, foreman, headquarters, etc. The model that is developed addresses current debates about the delegation of authority. It looks at the problem of contracting and subcontracting when information is incomplete and unobservable to at least one of the parties involved. The second part of the study involves the development of collective choice theory from a sequential choice perspective. It focuses on the provision of collective goods rather than particularistic goods. It attempts to include the electorate in the model and addresses questions concerning the amount of information the electorate has about collective goods programs. The third part of the study deals with interest groups and their influence at the electoral and legislative stages of the policy process. The fourth part of the study involves empirical tests of the sequential choice models of collective goods provision using data on entitlement expenditures. This project is of significant interest because it attempts to develop further a relatively novel approach to modeling political institutions, to integrate legislative and electoral determinants of policies, and to provide insights into the nature and evolution of entitlement programs.