Selling to Financially-Constrained Buyers

Sbr-9423649 Yen-Koo Che将博弈论应用于经济学的伟大成功故事之一是拍卖的分析和设计。最近联邦政府拍卖了部分无线电频谱的使用许可证，突显了这一点。尽管拍卖理论家已经成功地让他们的模型变得越来越现实，但到目前为止，他们忽视了竞标者的财务限制。该项目将开始通过评估财务约束对投标行为的影响来纠正这一点，当此类约束不是公开信息，而是仔细保护的秘密时。调查人员已经确定，根据许多常见的拍卖规则，被拍卖的商品不一定卖给最有价值的投标人。此外，财政限制的存在有利于彩票的使用，并倾向于全额付费拍卖，而不是第一价格的密封竞价拍卖。研究将分三个部分进行。第一部分考虑标准垄断模型，在该模型中，单一卖家将同质商品出售给连续的卖家。在第二部分中，调查者着眼于向许多潜在买家拍卖一种商品。第三部分探讨了卖方提供的低息融资的可取性。其他有前景的研究途径包括：联合竞标、合并以及私有化和破产政策的设计。

SBR-9423649 Yeon-Koo Che One of the great success stories of the application of game theory to economics has been in the analysis and design of auctions. This has been highlighted by the recent federal auctions of licenses for the use of parts of the radio spectrum. Although auction theorists have succeeded in making their models more and more realistic, they have so far ignored the financial constraints of the bidders. This project will begin to redress this by evaluating the effect of financial constraints on bidding behavior when such constraints are not public information, but rather carefully guarded secrets. The investigator has already determined that under many common auction rules the good being auctioned off is not necessarily sold to the bidder who values it the most. Furthermore, the presence of financial constraints favors the use of lotteries and tends to favor the all-pay auction over the first-price sealed-bid auction. The research will be conducted in three parts. Part 1 considers the standard monopoly model in which a single seller sells a homogenous good to a continuum of sellers. In Part 2, the investigator looks at the auction of a single good to many potential buyers. Part 3 examines the desirability of low-interest, seller-provided financing. Other promising avenues of research are: joint bidding, mergers, and the design of privatization and bankruptcy policies.