Contracting with Externalities

在许多经济情况下，双边合同会对第三方产生外部影响。例如：一个股东将他的股份出价给一个比公司现任管理层更优秀的公司掠夺者，增加了被收购的可能性，从而使公司的其他股东受益。债权人将陷入困境的企业的债务换为股权降低了破产的可能性，从而使该企业的其他债权人受益。录像机的购买者增加了录像带租赁市场，从而使兼容录像机的所有者受益。竞争企业的合并提高了市场价格，从而使市场上的其他企业受益。私人对公共产品的贡献使该产品的其他消费者受益。买方签订独家交易合同减少了未来市场竞争的可能性，从而损害了其他买方。制造商将其产品出售给零售商，降低了下游市场的价格，从而损害了与之竞争的零售商。在所有这些情况下，缔约方没有考虑到外部影响可能导致社会效率低下的结果。本项目发展了一个具有外部性的合同的一般模型，它统一了上面列出的例子，并阐明了产生的低效率的一般性质。特别是，所产生的扭曲的依赖性取决于各种假设，包括所涉当事方的数目、它们之间讨价还价的性质、它们提出歧视性报价的能力以及它们所能获得的一套合同。这一分析对具有外部性的环境中产权和合同程序的最佳设计有许多启示。应用包括金融（破产和收购）、产业组织（纵向和横向的合同和合并）和物权法（法律权利的设计）。

Project Abstract In many economic situations, bilateral contracting imposes external effects on third parties. For example: A shareholder tendering his shares to a corporate raider who is superior to the firm's incumbent management increasing the probability of takeover, thereby benefiting the firm's other shareholders. A creditor exchanging debt for equity in a distressed firm reduces the probability of bankruptcy, thereby benefiting the firm's other creditors. A buyer of a VCR increases the market for video rentals, thereby benefiting the owners of compatible VCRs. A merger of competing firms increases the market price, thereby benefiting other firms in the market. A private contributor to a public good benefits other consumers of the good. A buyer signing an exclusive dealing contract reduces the potential for future competition in the market, thereby hurting other buyers. A manufacturer selling his output to a retailer reduces the price in the downstream market, thus hurting competing retailers. In all these instances, the contracting parties' failure to take external effects into account may give rise to socially inefficient outcomes. This project develops a general model of contracting with externalities which unifies the examples listed above, and illuminates the general nature of arising inefficiencies. In particular, the dependence of the arising distortions depend on various assumptions, including the number of parties involved, the nature bargaining among them, their ability to make discriminatory offers, and the set of contracts available to them. This analysis has numerous implications for the optimal design of property rights and contracting procedures in environments with externalities. Applications include those from finance (bankruptcies and takeovers), industrial organization (vertical and horizontal contracting and mergers), and property law (the design of legal entitlements).