Comparative Political Economy

这项研究计划从政治经济学的角度关注公共政策比较理论的发展，其中政策是在嵌入政治体系的制度中选择的。主要的比较是总统制和议会制之间，以及公共和私人政治和机构之间的比较。政策的重点是有组织和无组织的利益对公共和私人公职人员选择的影响。在公共政治的背景下，利益试图影响政府的选择和政府的执政。在私人政治中。维权人士和利益集团试图在不依赖公共机构的情况下影响经济活动，他们向公司施压，要求它们改变做法，如环境保护政策或发展中国家工厂的工作条件。研究计划有三个主要组成部分。第一项是对议会制和总统制的比较研究，重点是政策选择的动态。议会制模式包括比例代表制选举制度、政府组建和政策选择。总统制的模式包括基于地理位置的选举制度和具有绝对多数特征的立法机构，其特征是总统否决和立法机构绝对多数，就像美国参议院的拖延战术一样。一个目标是将政党作为声誉载体纳入这些机构环境。主要的重点是政府的稳定性及其对经济冲击的政策反应。第二部分是研究利益集团对政治制度中选择的政策的影响。这项研究概括了现有的共同代理和收买选票的理论，以纳入除捐款之外的各种形式的影响；例如，基层动员选民。然后，通过研究比例代表制和基于地理的代表制中的选民和利益集团影响，将这一利益集团理论与研究计划的第一部分联系起来。这包括对政府和在任政府的选择的影响。这项研究的第三部分是关于私人政治；例如，激进团体直接向公司施加压力，试图改变这些公司的做法。这种压力可能采取有组织的消费者抵制或公开曝光的形式，比如海外工厂的工作条件。私人政治的博弈包括企业和活动家作为参与者，均衡可以对应于建立一个私人机构来缓解承诺、协调、信息和搭便车问题。对内生性私人机构的研究被扩展到组织电子市场的公司的私法。

This research program focuses on the development of comparative theories of public policy from a political economy perspective where policies are chosen within institu-tions embedded in a political system. The principal comparisons are between presidential and parliamentary systems and between public and private politics and institutions. The policy focus is on the influence of organized and unorganized interests on choices by public and private officeholders. In the context of public politics, interests attempt to influence both the choice of government and government in office. In private politics. activist and interest groups attempt to affect economic activity without reliance on public institutions by pressuring firms to change their practices, such as environmental protection policies or working conditions in factories in developing countries.The research program has three principal components. The first is a comparative study of parliamentary and presidential systems with an emphasis on the dynamics of policy choice. The model of parliamentary systems includes a proportional representation electoral system, government formation, and policy choice. The model of a presidential system includes a geography-based electoral system and a legislature with supermajority features arising from a presidential veto override and a legislative supermajority, as in the case of the filibuster in the U.S. Senate. One objective is to incorporate political parties as reputation carriers in these institutional settings. The principal focus is on the stability of governments and their policy responsiveness to economic shocks.The second component is the study of the influence of interest groups on the policies chosen in political systems. The research generalizes existing common agency and vote buying theories to incorporate forms of influence in addition to contributions; e.g., the grassroots mobilization of constituents. This interest group theory is then related to the first component of the research program by studying constituency and interest group influence in proportional representation and geography-based representation systems. This incorporates influence both on the choice of government and government in office.The third component of this research is on private politics; e.g., pressure applied directly to firms by activist groups seeking to change the practices of those firms. This pressure may take the form of an organized consumer boycott or public exposure of practices such as the working conditions in overseas factories. The game of private politics includes firms and activists as players, and the equilibrium can correspond to the establishment of a private institution to mitigate commitment, coordination, information, and free-rider problems. The research on endogenous private institutions is extended to the private law of firms that organize electronic markets.