Evaluating Collective Action Theory Through Cross-Cultural Analysis of Pre-Modern States

两位人类学家的这项研究将利用概率抽样和比较研究的方法，更好地理解集体行动如何在前现代国家的治理中发展。这是一个有趣的问题，因为基于集体的组织可能会因为行为问题而不稳定。理想情况下，合规的纳税人产生盈余，这些盈余进入尺子控制的公共基金，使集体(公共产品)受益，但紧张可能会加剧，因为尺子和主体将期望对方在公共产品的生产和分配方面表现得体。统治者代理(为个人利益侵占公共产品)和主体搭便车(受益于公共产品，但不有助于公共产品的生产)可能威胁组织稳定。为了确保集体组织能够发挥作用，必须建立检测和控制代理和搭便车的机构。为了评估这一理论，并更好地理解这种制度特征是如何在复杂的社会中形成的，这项研究将对来自世界所有地区的40至50个描述良好的案例的数据进行编码，这些数据来自人类关系领域档案和其他来源。要编码的变量包括公共产品的衡量标准(如道路、公共供水系统、公共安全和再分配经济)、主体税收遵从性、“发言权”(主体向尺子传达意见的能力)和“退出”(不满的主体离开政体的机会)，以及影响政策的统治者行为监测和控制、统治者道德以及收入和支出指标。这项研究将促进我们对前现代国家变化的本质和原因的理解，并将评估集体行动理论在不同社会和文化背景下的应用程度。这项研究应该会引起生物和社会科学领域的广大学生的兴趣，他们对合作社会行为的演变感兴趣，包括民主的社会和文化起源。

This research by two anthropologists will make use of probability samplingand comparative research methods to better understand how collective action can develop in the governance of pre-modern states. This is an interesting problem, because collectively-based organizations may be unstable due to behavioral problems. Ideally, compliant taxpayers produce surpluses that go to a communal fund controlled by rulers that benefits the collectivity (public goods), but tensions may develop owing to the fact that rulers and subjects will expect each other to behave appropriately with respect to the production and distribution of public goods. Ruler agency (appropriation of public goods for personal benefit) and subject free riding (benefiting from public goods but not contributing to their production) may threaten organizational stability. To assure that collective organizations can function, institutions must be developed to detect and control both agency and free riding. To evaluate the theory, and to better understand how such institutional features have been developed in complex societies, the research will code data from the Human Relations Area Files and other sources on 40 to 50 well-described cases from all world areas. Variables to be coded include measures of public goods (such as roads, public water systems, public safety, and redistributive economies), subject tax compliance, "voice" (the ability of subjects to communicate opinions to rulers), and "exit" (the opportunity for dissatisfied subjects to leave the polity), as well as ruler behavior monitoring and controls, ruler morality, and measures of income and expenditures which affect policy. This research will advance our understanding of the nature and causes of variation in pre-modern states and will evaluate the degree to which collective action theory can be applied in diverse social and cultural settings. The research should be of interest to a wide range of students in the biological and social sciences interested in the evolution of cooperative social behavior, including the social and cultural origins of democracy.