Theoretical Analysis of Bargaining in Economics and Politics

民主政治，为了理论分析的目的，可以分为选举政治和选举后政治，在选举中，选民决定代表，在选举后政治中，代表决定公共政策。而选举政治的研究重点是候选人进入决定，运动的行为，和选民的激励，选举后政治的研究从这些细节中抽象出来，并侧重于谈判和联盟的形成过程中的代表，在议会或立法机构，或跨政府的不同部门。 本项目从博弈论的角度研究选举后的政治，其中一个指定的公共政策制定的制度设置的数学模型，并在其中一个采用均衡的概念来预测理性的战略行为的结果。从技术上讲，该项目将选举后的政治分析为当选代表之间的“讨价还价游戏”。 目标是一个选举后政治的理论，可以在高度结构化的情况下产生尖锐的预测，当辩论围绕一个问题，代表的立场是明确的，这是一般性的，足以描述政策结果的广泛属性，如帕累托效率或现状的稳定性，在不太透明的情况下。该项目分为四个部分：第一部分证明，在一维问题中，战略谈判的唯一结果是中间（或“中间”）选民的理想结果;第二部分假设问题的结构较少，并考虑均衡存在，现状的稳定性等问题;第三部分探讨立法机关议程形成的策略层面;第四部分考察了政策结果随时间的动态变化。由于它将理论经济学的先进方法应用于政治问题的分析，该项目的结果将有助于立法，议会和委员会决策的政治科学文献，以及经济学中关于讨价还价和博弈论的文献。从学术的角度来看，该项目将提高我们对选举后政治的理解，是迈向综合选举和选举后政治分析的一般理论的一步。 从长远来看，这是充分理解现有政治制度、政治改革的影响和设计更好的政治制度的必要步骤。

Democratic politics, for the purpose of theoretical analysis, might be divided into electoral politics, in which voters determine representatives, and post-electoral politics, in which representatives determine public policy. Whereas the study of electoral politics focuses on the candidate entry decision, the conduct of campaigns, and the incentives of voters, the study of post-electoral politics abstracts from these details and focuses on the process of negotiation and coalition formation among representatives, within a parliament or legislature, or across different branches of government. This project studies post-electoral politics from a game-theoretic perspective, where one specifies a mathematical model of the institutional setting in which public policy is made, and where one employs concepts of equilibrium to predict the outcomes of rational strategic behavior. In technical terms, the project analyzes post-electoral politics as a "bargaining game" among elected representatives. The objective is a theory of post-electoral politics that can yield sharp predictions in highly structured situations, as when debate revolves around one issue and positions of representatives are clear, and that is general enough to describe broad properties of policy outcomes, such as Pareto efficiency or the stability of the status quo, in less transparent contexts. The project is divided into four parts: the first part proves that, in one-dimensional problems, the unique outcome of strategic bargaining is the ideal outcome of the middle (or "median") voter; the second part assumes less structure on the problem and considers issues of equilibrium existence, the stability of the status quo, etc.; the third part considers the strategic aspects of agenda formation in legislatures; and the fourth part examines the dynamics of policy outcomes over time.Because it applies advanced methods from theoretical economics to the analysis of political issues, the results of the project will contribute both to the political science literature on legislative, parliamentary, and committee decision-making, and to the literature in economics on bargaining and game theory. From an academic standpoint, the project will improve our understanding of post-electoral politics and is a step toward a general theory that integrates the analyses of both electoral and post-electoral politics. And this, from a long-range perspective, is a necessary step in the full understanding of existing political systems, the impact of political reforms, and the design of better political institutions.