Weak Property Rights and the Emergence of Labor Markets in Rural China

在转型经济体和发展中经济体，现有体制和规范阻碍或促进市场扩大的例子比比皆是。通过改革扭曲个人和企业决策的机构，知情的决策者通常希望提高对市场信号的反应能力，促进更有效的资源配置，并促进长期增长。与此同时，如果有关机构为无法从扩大市场准入所提供的机会中获益的个人提供安全保障，则重要的改革在政治上可能难以实施。本研究从中国农村村庄的视角考察了反应性与安全性之间的权衡。自20多年前中国开始改革以来，当地村领导对土地分配决策的控制有助于确保所有农村居民都能获得农业收入。然而，土地保有权的不安全扭曲了农民的积极性，可能限制家庭对进入非农业市场所提供的机会作出反应。

In transitional and developing economies, examples abound of ways in which existing institutions and norms either hinder or promote the widening of markets. By reforming institutions that distort individual and firm decisions, informed policymakers usually hope to increase responsiveness to market signals, facilitate more efficient allocation of resources, and promote long-term growth. At the same time, important reforms can be politically difficult to implement if the institutions involved provide security to individuals who are not able to benefit from opportunities provided by greater access to markets. This research examines the trade-off between responsiveness and security from the perspective of villages in rural China. Since the beginning of China's reform period over twenty years ago, local village leader control over decisions about land allocation has helped to insure that all rural residents have access to farm income. Insecurity of land tenure, however, distorts incentives of farmers and may limit household response to opportunities provided by access to off-farm markets.