Valence Politics with Activists: Empirical and Theoretical Models of Multicandidate Competition

空间投票模型是研究政治代理人（无论是候选人还是政治领导人）和选民之间相互作用的一种复杂方法。 然而，该理论预测，所有代理人将被吸引到选举中心，以最大限度地提高选票。 因此，结论是，政治竞争没有任何意义。 首席研究员和他的同事过去的研究强烈表明，这一结论在经验上是无效的，无论是在基于比例代表制的政体中，还是在基于多元化规则的政体中。 最近的研究表明，平均选民定理需要一个域约束，对选民的偏好政策的分布的支持。 实证分析表明，这一约束被违反的政治，如以色列，英国，美国，荷兰等不同的，相反，如果选举的不确定性是低的，那么各方应最佳定位自己在一个距离彼此在政策空间中的受欢迎程度（或效价）的代理人的差异所决定的。 “受欢迎程度”在概率单位和对数单位模型中作为选民效用函数中的常数来衡量。 在比例代表制下，受欢迎程度低的代理人会离开选举中心。 在多数规则下（如英国），受欢迎程度高的代理人将竞争中心。 这项研究模拟了活动家联盟为他们喜欢的候选人贡献时间和金钱的方式。 为了最大化投票份额，代理人将在激进联盟和中间派的选举拉力之间进行优化。 这里提出的理论发展的性质，这些选举激励代理人的反应。 然而，积极分子贡献的合理性尚未被纳入模型。 这项调查涉及与埃塞克斯大学的保罗·怀特利的合作。 怀特利的工作集中在英国领导人的受欢迎程度和活动家的支持，他已经开发了这些变量之间的关系的回归模型。 合作研究借鉴了这项研究，连同完成的选民和精英偏好的概率模型，构建活动家行为和政治反应的互动模型。

The spatial voting model is a sophisticated methodological device to study the interaction of political agents (whether candidates, or political leaders) and voters. However, the theory has predicted that all agents will be drawn to the electoral center in order to maximize votes. The conclusion, then, is that political competition is void of any relevance. Past research by the principal investigator and his colleagues strongly suggests that this conclusion is empirically invalid, both in polities based on proportional representation and in those based on plurality rule. Recent work by the researcher has shown that the mean voter theorem requires a domain constraint, on the support of the distribution of preferred policies of the electorate. Empirical analysis shows this constraint to be violated in polities as varied as Israel, Britain, the US, the Netherlands, etc. Instead, if electoral uncertainty is low, then parties should optimally position themselves at a distance from each other in the policy space determined by the differences in popularity (or valence) of the agents. "Popularity" is measured in the probit and logit models as constants in the voter utility functions. Under proportional representation, agents with low popularity are shown to leave the electoral center. Under plurality rule (as in Britain), agents with high popularity will contest the center. This research models the way activist coalitions make contributions of time and money to their preferred candidates. In order to maximize vote shares, agents will optimize between activist coalitions and the electoral pull of the center. The theory presented here develops the nature of response by agents to these electoral incentives. However, the rationality of activist contributions has not, as yet, been incorporated into the model. The investigation involves collaboration with Paul Whiteley of Essex University. Whiteley's work has focused on British leader popularity and activist support, and he has developed regression models of the relationships between these variables. The collaborative research draws on this research, together with completed probit models of voter and elite preferences, to construct an interactive model of activist behavior and political response.