Topics in Dynamics, Auctions and Voting

该项目是动态、拍卖和投票领域理论经济研究的延续。在动力学中，所提出的问题涉及到马尔可夫完美均衡、不可预见的偶然性、双曲贴现和软预算约束。拍卖领域的工作将研究买家之间的不对称、高价拍卖、有效拍卖和卖方预算限制的拍卖，而投票领域的研究将研究与问责制和投票规则的稳健性相关的问题。这些关于马尔可夫完美均衡的发现对许多在工作中使用这一均衡概念的应用研究人员应该是有用的。不可预见的或有事件的研究将会引起契约理论基础的研究人员的兴趣，更广泛地说，是决策理论基础的研究人员。双曲折现的工作将有助于经济学和心理学之间的边界的文献。软预算约束领域的研究结果不仅对学术研究人员有重要意义，而且对那些参与设计集中经济向分散系统转变的政策的人也有重要意义。拍卖理论标题下提出的问题将引起广大拍卖理论家以及那些希望为私有化和减少污染等目的设计拍卖的人的兴趣，而关于投票的工作应有助于政治经济学家、政治科学家和那些设想改革选举制度的人。

The project is a continuation of theoretical economic research in the areas of dynamics, auctions, and voting. Within dynamics, the questions posed bear on Markov perfect equilibrium, unforeseen contingencies, hyperbolic discounting, and the soft budget constraint. Work in auctions will investigate asymmetries between buyers, the high bid auction, efficient auctions, and auctions with seller budget constraints, while research in the area of voting will examine issues related to accountability and the robustness of voting rules.The findings on Markov perfect equilibrium should prove useful to the many applied researchers who use this equilibrium concept in their work. Research on unforeseen contingencies will be of interest to those working on the foundations of contract theory and, more generally, the foundations of decision theory. The work in hyperbolic discounting will contribute to the literature on the boundary between economics and psychology. Findings in the area of the soft budget constraint will have significance not only for academic researchers but also for those involved in designing policy for the transformation of centralized economies to decentralized systems. The questions posed under the heading of auction theory will be of interest to the large community of auction theorists, as well as to those wishing to design auctions for such purposes as privatization and pollution reduction, while the work on voting should be helpful to political economists, political scientists, and to those envisaging reform of electoral systems.