Doctoral Dissertation in Law and Social Science: Attacking the Court: The Logic of An American Tradition

派和C-派：格雷戈里·A·胡贝尔和斯蒂芬·M·恩格尔法律和社会科学博士论文：攻击法院：美国传统的逻辑在过去十年里，对联邦司法权力的修辞攻击有所增加。然而，尽管民选官员、利益集团领导人和学者谴责法院的不民主潜力，但这样的例证并不新鲜。这些攻击在整个美国历史上都发生过；有些相当于口头上的咆哮，另一些则是更可信的威胁，要求剥夺司法权，还有一些攻击的特点是通过了从结构上削弱联邦法院的措施。这种差异的原因是什么？为什么最近对联邦司法机构的攻击从来不会超越言辞，而19世纪的案例的特点是通过了从结构上削弱最高法院的措施？通过调查采取反法院行动的案件，即剥夺管辖权、堆叠法院、司法弹劾等案件，以及普遍存在反法院言论但没有采取纪律行动的案件，我发展了一种解释这种模式的理论。我认为，与其像目前的许多文献那样依赖司法至上的规范，我认为，没有后续行动的修辞攻击是一种理性的战略，取决于政党等宪法外机构随着时间的推移而发生的变化，这些机构会影响政客们对司法等宪法机构的看法。因此，尽管利用“反多数主义困境”的幽灵来攻击联邦司法机构的不民主潜力，可能符合政客们的短期选举利益，但保持司法权力作为实现政策目标的有用武器，也可能符合他们的长期利益。证据收集自大N和案例分析。为了构建一个何时考虑反法院行动的数据集，我评估了国家政党纲领和参众两院期刊。这些扫荡被用来测试反法院的言论和/或行动是否与国会中政党两极分化和凝聚力加剧的时期相关。对反法院言论和行动的五个具体事例的案例研究说明和分析将依赖于平台、会议厅的辩论以及通过档案研究收集的其他数据。对当代反司法情绪和行动的分析还将涉及采访民选和利益集团精英。反法院情绪是美国重要的政治传统。虽然言辞经常出现，但政客们是否会在结构上削弱法院在政治上是有可能的，因此，那些有利于在言辞之外发动攻击的条件可能会卷土重来。因此，最近签署声明的增加，通过2006年军事委员会法案暂停人身保护令，以及前共和党众议院通过措施剥夺与堕胎、婚姻和宗教表达有关的联邦下级法院的管辖权，都提醒我们这种可能性。

PI and C-PI: Gregory A. Huber and Stephen M. EngelDoctoral Dissertation in Law and Social Science: Attacking the Court: The Logic of An American TraditionSES - 0719031 Over the last decade, rhetorical attacks on federal judicial power have increased. Yet, while elected officials, interest groups leaders, and academics decry the undemocratic potential of the courts, such speechifying is hardly new. These attacks have occurred throughout American history; some amount to rhetorical bluster, others more credible threats to strip judicial power, and still others are characterized by the passage of measures that structurally weaken the federal courts. What accounts for this variation? Why do more recent attacks on the federal judiciary never rise above rhetoric whereas nineteenth-century instances are characterized by measures passed to structurally weaken the Court? By investigating cases where anti-Court actions are taken, i.e., jurisdiction stripping, court-stacking, judicial impeachment, etc., as well as cases where anti-Court rhetoric is prevalent yet no disciplinary action follows, I develop a theory explaining this pattern. Rather than rely on norms of judicial supremacy as much of the current literature does, I contend that rhetorical attack without follow-through is a rational strategy contingent on changes over time to extra-constitutional institutions, such as parties, that influence how politicians view constitutional institutions, such as the judiciary. Thus, while it may be in politicians' short-term electoral interest to attack the undemocratic potential of the federal judiciary, exploiting the specter of a "countermajoritarian difficulty", it may also be in their long-term interest to maintain judicial power as a useful weapon to implement policy aims. Evidence is gathered from large-N and case study analysis. To construct a dataset of when anti-Court action was considered, I evaluate national party platforms and House and Senate Journals. These sweeps are used to test whether anti-Court rhetoric and/or action is correlated with periods of heightened party polarization and cohesion in Congress. Case study description and analysis of five particular instances of anti-Court rhetoric and action will rely on the platforms, chamber floor debates as well as other data collected through archival research. Analysis of the contemporary instance of anti-judicial sentiment and action will also involve interviewing elected and interest group elites. Anti-Court sentiment is an important American political tradition. While the rhetoric recurs regularly, whether politicians will weaken the Court structurally is politically contingent, and those conditions conducive to attack beyond rhetoric could therefore return. Thus, the recent increase in signing statements, the suspension of habeas corpus through the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and the former Republican House's passage of measures to strip jurisdiction in matters related to abortion, marriage, and religious expression from lower federal courts remind us of that potential.