Doctoral Dissertation Research on Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment: 1991 - 2006

David C. Nixon和Cole D. Taratoot博士论文研究：政治环境下的行政法法官决策，1991 - 2006 （ses - 0719274）项目摘要：在一个日益复杂的社会中，对专家官僚的依赖日益增加，加上行政人员与政治的隔绝，在确定非选举产生的官僚在民主社会中的适当角色方面产生了一个困境。司法学者已经证明，司法部门的独立性使法官能够在很大程度上根据自己的政治偏好作出决定。同样，联邦公务员与政治参与的隔离可能使官僚能够将自己的个人政治偏好插入政策决策中。使用各种统计方法，本研究系统地检查了一组官僚专家，国家劳工关系委员会的行政法法官（alj），以确定个人政治偏好是否在官僚决策中发挥作用。此外，本研究还通过审查上诉机构在向机构董事会成员和相关的美国巡回上诉法院提起上诉时，上诉法院的决定被审查机构采纳的程度，审查了上诉法院偏好的影响范围。结果有助于确定美国政府官僚政治决策的性质和普遍性。最后，我研究了当考虑到委员会和美国巡回上诉法院的政治任命审查时，司法法官在决策中采取战略行动的程度，以及战略考虑是否可以限制或掩盖司法法官的政治决策。结果表明，司法控制提供了一种限制官僚自由裁量权的手段。这些统计分析是根据1991年以来100多个上诉法院作出的近6 000项初步决定以及随后向委员会和上诉法院提出的所有上诉所收集的。该项目通过联系州和地方选举委员会以及搜索联邦选举委员会的记录来确定ALJ的政党关系。党派关系数据主要在NLRB四个法官分院周围的地点收集：亚特兰大、纽约、旧金山和华盛顿特区。这个项目对官僚政治和司法政治的文学都做出了令人兴奋的新贡献。它将我们对司法程序的理解扩展到官僚机构的领域，我们知道这是一个高度讲究法律的领域。它还通过具体考察政治偏好，增强了我们对官僚激励机制的理解。如果公众希望在专业知识的基础上做出复杂的决定，而不是依靠自己的政治偏好来解决问题的官僚，这促使我们重新评估我们对非选举产生的政府官员做出影响美国人的决定的日益依赖。

David C. Nixon and Cole D. Taratoot Doctoral Dissertation Research: Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment, 1991 to 2006SES - 0719274 Project AbstractAn increased reliance on expert bureaucrats in an increasingly complex society combined with the insulation from politics afforded to administrators has created a dilemma in determining the proper role for unelected bureaucrats in a democratic society. Judicial scholars have demonstrated that the independence of the judicial branch enables judges to base decisions largely on their own political preferences. It is possible that the insulation from political involvement that is afforded to federal civil servants similarly enables bureaucrats to insert their own personal political preferences into policy decisionsUsing a variety of statistical methods, this study systematically examines one set of bureaucratic experts, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) at the National Labor Relations Board, to determine whether personal political preferences play a role in bureaucratic decision making. Additionally, the study examines the reach of the influence of ALJ preferences by examining the extent to which ALJ decisions are adopted by reviewing bodies when cases are appealed to the agency's Board members and the relevant U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Results help to determine the nature and pervasiveness of political decision making by bureaucrats in American government. Lastly, I examine the extent to which ALJs act strategically in their decision making when considering review by the political appointees of the Board and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and whether strategic considerations can limit or mask political decision making by ALJs. The results speak to the degree to which judicial controls provide a means of limiting bureaucratic discretion.These statistical analyses are based on a collection of nearly 6,000 initial decisions issued by over 100 ALJs as well as all subsequent appeals to the Board and Courts of Appeals, since 1991. The project identifies ALJ political party affiliation by contacting state and local boards of elections and searching FEC records. Party affiliation data are gathered primarily at locations surrounding the four Divisions of Judges of the NLRB: Atlanta, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. This project makes exciting new contributions to literature in both bureaucratic and judicial politics. It extends our understanding of the judicial process into the realm of the bureaucracy, an arena we know to be highly legalistic. It also augments our understanding of bureaucratic incentives, by specifically examining political preferences. If the public's desire to have complex decisions made on the basis of expertise is instead met with bureaucrats who rely on their own political preferences to solve problems, this prompts us to reassess our increasing reliance on unelected government officials to make decisions that impact Americans.