TC:Small: Systems-Sensitive Cryptography

密码学往往无法影响实践，因为它对实现和支持它的系统的要求和现实不敏感。这项研究旨在改变这一点。考虑的问题包括遗留问题(改变组成当今世界的复杂计算机系统成本高昂且容易出错，因此评估现有方法的安全性可能比提供新方法更重要)、恶意软件(系统渗透率很高，暴露了密码学依赖于安全的密钥)以及随机性的现实(它在实践中缺乏理论上预期的质量，注定了许多加密方案的失败)。要做的工作包括在面临广泛的系统危害时评估SSL加密的安全性，技术上称为选择性开放；分析基于密码的密钥推导的PKCS#1标准；设计对冲加密方案，在提供给它们的随机性质量较差时尽可能保持安全性；以及研究和设计防止相关密钥攻击的密码学。这项工作的影响是为目前由数百万人使用的现有的、已部署的密码学提供更高的保证，以及为过渡到真实系统而处于有利地位的新密码学。

Cryptography often fails to impact practice because it is insensitive to the requirements and reality of the systems that implement and underlie it. This research aims to change this. Issues considered include legacy (changing the complex computer systems that make up today's world is expensive and error-prone, so assessing the security of existing methods can be more important than providing new ones), malware (system penetration is widespread, exposing the keys that cryptography relies on for security) and the realities of randomness (it lacks in practice the quality expected in theory, dooming many cryptographic schemes). Work to be done includes assessment of the security of SSL encryption in the face of widespread system compromise, technically known as selective opening; analysis of the PKCS#1 standard for password-based key derivation; design of hedged encryption schemes that retain as much security as possible when the randomness they are fed is of poor quality; and the study and design of cryptography secure against related-key attacks. The impact of this work is higher assurance for existing, deployed cryptography currently used by millions, and new cryptography that is well-placed to transition into real systems.