Informed Principals and Learning Agents: Modeling Outcomes from Federal Grants for Sustainable Energy

在这个项目中，研究小组将研究政府间赠款如何塑造代理人的偏好，使代理人的选择将受到影响超出赠款计划的寿命。特别是，该项目侧重于联邦赠款如何影响地方政府的偏好。这项工作是基于一个“知情的校长学习代理人”（IP-LA）的框架，认为信息，共享风险，并通过赠款申请和实施产生的政策学习改变代理人的偏好和目标，使所需的行为应该坚持。在这个模型中，偏好是内生的战略，这与大多数委托代理模型，假设固定的偏好。这项研究将分析能源效率和保护赠款对地方政府能源计划和可持续性偏好的影响，以及市政当局是否继续现有的计划，改变或重新配置计划，或在联邦资金耗尽后停止它们。就更广泛的影响而言，这项工作涉及政府间计划的设计和实施中涉及的实际政策问题，特别是一次性赠款。这项研究的结果可以为政策设计和实施战略提供信息，特别是在新的或迅速扩大的政策领域，如地方能源/气候政策。

In this project the research team will examine how intergovernmental grants shape agents' preferences so that the agents' choices will be influenced beyond the lifespan of a grant program. In particular, the project focuses on how federal grants may shape the preferences of local governments. The work is based on an "informed principals-learning agents" (IP-LA) framework which argues that the information, shared risk, and policy learning produced through grant application and implementation alter the preferences and goals of agents so that the desired behaviors should persist. In this model, preferences are endogenous to strategy, which contrasts with most principal-agent models that assume fixed preferences. The research will analyze the impact of energy efficiency and conservation grants on the energy program and sustainability preferences of local governments and whether municipalities continue existing programs, alter or reconfigure programs, or discontinue them after federal funds have been exhausted.In terms of broader impacts, this work addresses practical policy issues involved in the design and implementation of intergovernmental programs, especially targeted one-shot grants. The outcomes of this research can inform policy designs and implementation strategies, especially in new or rapidly expanding policy arenas such local energy/climate policy.