Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Traditional Authority in the State: Chiefs and Taxation in Ghana

在现代国家中，传统权威的政治是什么？非洲学者经常将传统权威描述为与民选官员的权力相对抗。但越来越多的轶事证据揭示了一种更为复杂的关系，这种关系会产生至关重要的政治和经济后果。我试图通过战略分析来解释加纳正式和非正式政治机构之间的相互作用，描述合作的变化以及由此产生的政治和发展结果。我假设当选的地方政治家（负责人）和地方酋长（代理人）之间存在战略委托关系，以促进酋长影响公民投票选择的候选人更大的连任成功。作为这种服务的交换，酋长们在不受政府干预的情况下获得了更大的财政自主权。酋长和政治家之间的这种服务交易既使酋长们在经济上富有，又增加了他们作为社区中强大人物的合法性。发展领域权力的增加使酋长们能够利用这种影响为某些候选人动员选票。随着酋长们越来越多地参与协调财政决策，民选政府的日常重要性就会下降。官员和酋长之间的委托关系削弱了政治家和公民之间的选举联系，最终降低了民主竞争。为了理解这种委托环境，我使用了几种方法，结合了全国范围的描述性分析、形式理论和加纳南部的大型家庭调查。我将主要利用权威来解释投票站一级的选举结果，使用我对传统权力和选举数据的衡量数据，以便更好地理解这个代表团的战略考虑。我将创建一个带有道德风险的正式授权模型，其中工资合同代表了首席执行官被授予的财政自主权水平。最后，我将使用一个随机的自然实验，对传统权威水平进行干预，以评估因果关系。我用加纳殖民时期修建和规划的铁路的位置信息来论证现代交通基础设施削弱了传统的社会结构。然后，我计划对治疗和安慰剂铁路线沿线的村庄进行抽样调查，对选民动员、税收贡献和公共服务获取进行大规模的家庭调查。这个项目将产生一系列更广泛的影响。它可以帮助决策者设计政治和经济发展项目。捐助国官员知道传统权威机构对其项目的成败具有影响力，但很少有研究试图记录和解释这种影响力。了解地方政治与传统权威之间的关系是设计更有效地实现其目标的政策的重要一步。这项研究有能力影响决策者如何看待民主进程中非正式政治行为者的作用。目前，加纳宪法禁止酋长参与政治进程。如果我发现酋长破坏民主进程的证据，这可能会导致加纳加强选民教育和反投票购买运动。相反，如果我发现地方非正式机构提供的公共服务效率和质量更高的证据，这可能会导致更多的财政权力和权力下放给酋长，以促进地方发展，这一政策可能会对加纳和非洲以外的地区产生广泛影响。通过将非正式和传统权威纳入这些社会的政策分析范围，可以确定加强民主进程和促进经济增长的新战略。这项研究的结果将特别适用于加纳，但其经验教训也可能适用于其他发展中国家的情况。

What are the politics of traditional authority in the modern state? Scholars of Africa often depict traditional authority as antagonistic to the power of elected officials. But increasing anecdotal evidence reveals a more complex relationship that generates crucial political and economic consequences. I seek to explain the interaction between formal and informal political institutions in Ghana with a strategic analysis, describing both variation in cooperation and the political and developmental outcomes that result. I hypothesize that a strategic delegation relationship exists between elected local politicians (principals) and local chiefs (agents) to facilitate greater re-election success for candidates with chiefs influencing citizen vote choice. In exchange for this service, chiefs gain greater fiscal autonomy without interference by the government. This trade of services between chiefs and politicians both enriches chiefs financially and increases their legitimacy as powerful figures in the community. This increased power in the development sphere allows chiefs to parlay that influence into vote mobilization for certain candidates. As chiefs become more involved in coordinating fiscal decisions, the daily importance of elected government decreases. The delegation relationship between officials and chiefs weakens the electoral connections between politicians and citizens, ultimately lowering democratic competition. To understand this delegation environment, I utilize several methods, combining nation-wide descriptive analysis, formal theory, and a large household survey in southern Ghana. I will use chiefly authority to explain electoral outcomes at the polling station level by using data from my measure of traditional power and electoral data to better understand the strategic considerations of this delegation. I will create a formal model of delegation with moral hazard, where the wage contract represents the level of fiscal autonomy chiefs are granted. Lastly, I will use a random natural experiment that has an intervention for the level of traditional authority in order to assess causal effects. I use information about the location of built and planned railroads in colonial Ghana to argue that modern transportation infrastructure weakened the traditional social fabric. I then plan to sample villages along the treatment and placebo rail lines to conduct a large household survey about voter mobilization, tax contribution, and public service access.This project will have a number of broader impacts. It can help policymakers as they design political and economic development projects. Donor officials know the power that traditional authorities have over the success and failure of their projects, yet little research has been attempted to document and explain this power. Understanding the relationship between local politics and traditional authority is a great step toward designing policy that can more effectively meet its objectives. This research has the ability to influence how policy-makers view the role of informal political actors within the democratic process. Currently, Ghanaian chiefs are constitutionally barred from the political process. If I find evidence that chiefs undermine the democratic process, this could lead to enhanced voter education and anti-vote buying campaigns within Ghana. Conversely, if I find evidence of greater efficiency and quality of public services provided by local informal institutions, this might lead to greater delegation of fiscal authority and power for chiefs to promote local development, a policy that could have widespread implications beyond Ghana and Africa. By including informal and traditional authority into the scope of policy analysis within these societies, new strategies to enhance the democratic process and promote economic growth may be identified. The findings of this study will apply to Ghana specifically, but its lessons may apply to other developing country contexts as well.