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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: How Do Voters Decide? Ethnicity and Performance in African Elections

Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: How Do Voters Decide? Ethnicity and Performance in African Elections
政治学博士论文研究:选民如何决定?
批准号:
0718782
负责人:
Clark Gibson
金额:
$1.2万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2007
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2007-08-01 至 2008-07-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
主要研究者:Clark C.吉布森和詹姆斯D.博士论文研究:选民如何决定?非洲选举中的种族和表现非洲公民在民主选举中选择领导人的基础是什么? 非洲的选举通常被理解为高度种族化,候选人通过煽动种族恐惧或使用诸如赞助等有选择的激励措施来吸引选民的支持。 这项研究通过确定何时,何地以及种族和表现的重要性,无论是单独还是结合起来,推进了我们对非洲投票行为的理解。 因此,这将表明政治家是否追求政策,商品和服务针对自己的种族群体或更广泛的地区或国家。 如果种族假设是正确的,同种族的人将一次又一次地回到办公室,并狭隘地针对他们的群体制定政策。 如果性能假设是正确的,表现不佳的将被抛出办公室和政治家将被鼓励推行针对同种族和非ethnics.To了解是否以及如何种族和性能的事项投票的政策,本研究提出了一个选举后的调查肯尼亚即将举行的2007年12月的选举。 它将由从全国代表性样本的选区随机选择的选民组成。 该调查将询问有关种族、业绩评价以及地方和国家选举中候选人投票选择的问题。 本研究通过使用新的个体水平调查数据,对现有研究进行了实证和方法上的改进。 该调查没有假定族裔或群体表现的影响,而是允许对这些变量进行有力和直接的测试,以确定个人的投票。 对地方和国家选举进行研究可以使用不同的选举单位进行单独的测试,这些选举单位在许多特征上有所不同。 它比现有的研究提供了更好的绩效衡量标准,被理解为通过税收提供地方公共服务。 通过随机化,该调查还避免了困扰其他研究的选择偏差问题。 这些数据将使我能够测试关于种族和表现的独立影响以及两者相互作用的方式的单独假设。这一项目的广泛影响对多族裔和贫穷国家的发展具有重要意义。 这项研究的结果可以为政治家,政策制定者和捐助者提供有关公民和领导人在种族,绩效,公共服务和税收问题上的关系的重要信息。 如果绩效理论是正确的,那么选举就是促使政治家承担责任的主要机制。 这些政策可能反过来成为持续经济增长和发展的动力。 如果种族理论是正确的,我们可能会预期扭曲的政策偏见,从长远来看对进步有害。在地方一级尤其如此,学者和决策者越来越多地将地方政府视为发展的潜在催化剂。
英文摘要
Primary Investigators: Clark C. Gibson and James D. LongTitle: Doctoral Dissertation Research: How do Voters Decide? Ethnicity and Performance in African Elections0718782AbstractOn what bases do African citizens choose leaders in democratic elections? African elections are typically understood as highly ethnic, where candidates appeal to voters by inciting ethnic fear or using selective incentives such as patronage to attract support from co-ethnics. The study advances our understanding of African voting behavior by identifying when, where and in what ways ethnicity and performance matter, either separately or in conjunction. Consequently, this will demonstrate whether politicians pursue policies, goods, and services directed at their own ethnic group or more broadly to the district or nation. If ethnic hypotheses are correct, co-ethnics will be returned to office time and again and narrowly target policies towards their group. If performance hypotheses are correct, poor performers will be thrown out of office and politicians will be encouraged to pursue policies targeted towards co-ethnics and non-ethnics alike.In order to understand whether and how ethnicity and performance matter to voting, this study proposes a post-election survey of Kenya's upcoming December 2007 election. It will consist of randomly chosen voters from precincts in a nationally representative sample. The survey will ask questions regarding ethnicity, evaluations of performance, and vote choice for candidates in local and national elections. The study makes empirical and methodological improvements upon current studies by using novel individual level survey data. Rather than postulate the effects of ethnicity or performance at the group level, the survey allows for robust and direct tests of these variables in determining an individual's vote. Performing the study for local and national elections allows for separate tests using different electoral units that vary over a number of characteristics. It provides a better measure of performance than extant studies, understood as the delivery of local public services that result from taxation. Through randomization, the survey also avoids problems of selection bias that plague other studies. Such data will allow me to test separate hypotheses concerning the independent effects of ethnicity and performance, as well as the ways in which the two interact. The broader impact of this project has important implications for development in multi-ethnic and poor countries. The results of this study can provide politicians, policymakers and donors with critical information regarding the relationship between citizens and leaders over issues of ethnicity, performance, public services, and taxation. If performance theories are correct, elections are the prime mechanism that induces accountability on the part of politicians. These policies may in turn become the engine to sustained economic growth and development. If ethnic theories are correct, we might expect skewed policy biases that are harmful for progress over the long-run. This is especially true at the local level, where scholars and policymakers increasingly view local government as the potential catalyst for development.
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会议论文
Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption Displacement
  • 批准号:
    1424348
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $31.54万
  • 财政年份:
    2014
  • 负责人:
    Clark Gibson
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Effects of Climatic Volatility on Economic Conditions and Voter Behavior in Africa
  • 批准号:
    1424091
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.76万
  • 财政年份:
    2014
  • 负责人:
    Clark Gibson
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Traditional Authority in the State: Chiefs and Taxation in Ghana
  • 批准号:
    1160467
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.2万
  • 财政年份:
    2012
  • 负责人:
    Clark Gibson
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Does Power Corrupt? An Experimental Approach To Explore the Origins of Corruption in Africa
  • 批准号:
    1160515
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.19万
  • 财政年份:
    2012
  • 负责人:
    Clark Gibson
  • 依托单位:
海外基金