TWC: Small: Measuring and improving BGP churn resilience

在因特网上传输数据的最基本的服务是路由，它的任务是计算消息在非直接连接的网络之间必须遵循的路径。虽然大量的工作已经研究了确保这些路径被正确计算的任务，但令人惊讶的是，很少有工作研究在受到攻击时，计算这些路径的计算机、软件和协议系统的行为，我们称之为路由系统。这个项目正在研究互联网路由系统的恢复能力，这些攻击通过强迫程序或计算机（暂时）停止参与路由系统来诱导“流失”。该项目正在设计实验和模拟，以允许开发数学模型，以测量路由系统对“级联故障”的脆弱性，这些故障由资源耗尽、软件故障和协议错误引起，导致整个路由系统不可用。该项目还在开发减轻这些攻击影响的方法。该项目预计将产生新的数据、模型和软件，社区可以使用这些数据、模型和软件来评估和改进当前路由系统的行为，并在破坏稳定的攻击下提出“未来互联网”设计，对美国和其他国家的安全和经济健康产生积极影响。

The most fundamental service for the delivery of data on the Internet is routing, the task of computing the path that messages must follow in order to go between networks that are not directly connected. While a large body of work has studied the task of ensuring that these paths are computed correctly, surprisingly little work has been done to study the behavior, when under attack, of the system of computers, software and protocols that compute these paths, what we call the routing system. This project is investigating the resilience of the Internet routing system to attacks that induce "churn" by forcing programs or computers to (temporarily) stop participating in the routing system. The project is devising experiments and simulations that will allow the development of mathematical models that can measure the vulnerability of the routing system to "cascading failures," caused by resource depletion, software faults, and protocol errors, that cause the entire routing system to become unavailable. The project is also developing methods to mitigate the effects of these attacks.The project is expected to result in new data, models, and software that can be used by the community to evaluate and improve the behavior of the current routing system and proposed "future Internet" designs under destabilizing attacks, positively impacting the safety and economic health of the United States and other nations.