TWC: Breakthrough: Inspection Resistance in Cyber-Physical Systems

随着计算设备不断嵌入到越来越多的物理设备中，它们现在已经掌握了我们生活中最机密的信息。在内存中安全地保存秘密的能力是绝大多数安全系统的核心，但是面对可以对这些设备和底层硬件进行无限制物理访问的攻击者，存储和删除这些秘密是一个难题。根据内存技术的不同，存储1而不是0的行为可能会产生可测量的物理副作用，即使在断电之后也是如此。通过开发一种新的体系结构，这种体系结构显著地增加了物理分析的难度，该项目使系统能够被信任，即使系统的物理控制被让给对手。初步结果表明，创建一种有效的内存保护方案是可能的，在这种方案下，即使攻击者能够以5%的概率错误检查存储位的值，系统也能够以99.9999999999%的概率阻止攻击者学习有关原始未编码位的任何信息。从长远来看，这项研究将有助于创建网络物理系统工程师开发普遍可信系统所需的技能和工具，并简化我们所有人的安全和生计所依赖的关键任务系统的开发。

As computing devices continue to be embedded in more and more physical devices, they are now privy to the most confidential information about our lives. The ability to safely keep a secret in memory is central to the vast majority of security systems, but storing and erasing these secrets is a difficult problem in the face of an attacker who can obtain unrestricted physical access to these devices and the underlying hardware. Depending on the memory technology, the very act of storing a 1 instead of a 0 can have physical side effects measurable even after the power has been cut. Through the development of a new class of architectures that measurably increase the difficulty of physical analysis this project is enabling systems that can be trusted even when physical control of the system is ceded to an adversary. Initial results indicate that the creation of an efficient scheme for memory protection is possible under which, even if an adversary is able to inspect the value of a stored bit with a probabilistic error of only 5%, the system will be able to prevent that adversary from learning any information about the original un-coded bits with 99.9999999999% probability. Over the long term this research will help to create the skills and tools that cyber-physical system engineers will need to develop pervasive trustworthy systems, and to ease the development of those mission critical systems that we all depend on for our safety and livelihood.