Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informational Robust Approach

该奖项资助研究开发新方法，以确定通过拍卖购买和出售商品的最佳方式。拍卖方法被政府和私人公司广泛使用。例如，联邦机构越来越多地使用网上电子逆向拍卖作为一种采购方法。与此同时，联邦通信委员会、内政部和财政部等机构利用拍卖来出售从国库券到石油和天然气租赁的所有东西。这个项目将使用博弈论找到拍卖规则，将在广泛的情况下表现良好。它试图制定规则，当投标人对拍卖物品的价值相同，但对确切价值有不同的信息时，这些规则将很好地发挥作用。该项目推进了拍卖理论的基础科学，并将导致更好的公共采购程序和更好的方法，从木材，石油和天然气等自然资源的销售中产生公共资金。该项目的方法部分可导致开发更有效的在线交易平台。因此，该项目有利于美国经济。该项目的目的是表征收入最大化拍卖时，投标人有一个共同的价值被出售的货物。本研究将发展新的最优稳健拍卖理论，在不同的投标人信念模型和不同类型的均衡行为之间提供有利的收入保证。现有的理论确定最优拍卖设计是高度敏感的建模假设。这个项目将开发拍卖设计，不太敏感的模型误指定。除了推进最优拍卖理论，该项目还将开发和演示在具有丰富信息或潜在复杂均衡策略的模型中设计机制的方法。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This award funds research to develop new methods for identifying the best ways to buy and sell goods via auctions. Auction methods are widely used by governments and private firms. For example, web-based electronic reverse auctions are increasing used as a procurement method by Federal agencies. At the same time, agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Treasury use auctions to sell everything from Treasury bills to oil and gas leases. This project will use game theory to find auction rules that will perform well in a wide range of situations. It seeks to develop rules that will work well when bidders place the same value on the auctioned good but have different information about the exact value. The project advances the basic science of auction theory, and will lead to better procedures for public procurement and better methods for generating public funds from the sale of natural resources such as timber, oil, and gas. The methodological component of the project could lead to the development of more efficient online trading platforms. The project therefore benefits the U.S. economy.The aim of the project is to characterize revenue maximizing auctions when bidders have a common valuation for the good being sold. This research will develop new theories of optimal robust auctions that provide favorable revenue guarantees across different models of bidder beliefs and across different kinds of equilibrium behavior. Existing theories identify optimal auction designs that are highly sensitive to modeling assumptions. This project will develop auction designs that are less sensitive to model misspecification. Besides advancing the theory of optimal auctions, the project will also develop and demonstrate methods for designing mechanisms in models with rich information or potentially complex equilibrium strategies.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.