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Collaborative Research: Implications of Solar Radiation Management for Strategic Behavior and Climate Governance

Collaborative Research: Implications of Solar Radiation Management for Strategic Behavior and Climate Governance
合作研究:太阳辐射管理对战略行为和气候治理的影响
批准号:
1948154
负责人:
Mark Borsuk
金额:
$56.59万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2020
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2020-04-01 至 2024-03-31

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
最近的科学报告警告说,如果不迅速减少温室气体排放,将对全球产生严重影响,一些国家或其他实体可能倾向于寻求一种不需要国际合作的技术气候管理战略。太阳辐射管理(SRM)正在成为各种潜在的“地球工程”技术中的主要候选技术。SRM旨在增加反射回太空的太阳光量,以抵消温室气体排放的吸热效应。其中一种方法是在平流层中广泛释放反射粒子,这种方法预计特别便宜且见效快。这意味着一个特别容易受到气候变化影响的国家可能决定部署SRM,即使它可能对其他国家有害。本研究项目旨在调查地球工程的潜在可用性和实施可能如何影响未来的气候行动和影响。研究小组还探讨了替代性国际治理框架可能促进实现最大全球利益的战略的方式。随着气候变化变得更加紧迫,各国努力达成合作解决方案,该项目通过考虑决策的潜在演变,推进了现有的气候行动理论和模型。这一理论进步通过行为实验室实验和计算机模型模拟得到了加强。通过提供对地球工程更广泛的影响的见解,该研究是及时的和社会相关的。具体而言,研究人员通过三个主要机制扩大了工作的影响:(i)国内和国际气候政策制定者的直接参与,以提高对SRM影响的相互理解;(ii)翻译和传播我们的建模和实验工具和结果,以便应用于科技政策的其他问题;(三)为多元学生提供与社会相关的经验,发展他们与决策者沟通的能力。气候变化是一个典型的公共产品问题,需要集体行动才能成功地共同管理。然而,全球应对气候变化的集体行动是一项挑战,因为每个潜在行动者都有“搭便车”他人行动的动机。这导致整体行动不足——即所谓的“公地悲剧”。然而,太阳辐射管理(SRM)作为一种非合作的气候变化管理策略的潜力可能会改变这种情况。特别是,向平流层注入反射粒子可能是一种足够便宜和简单的冷却地球的方法,可以由一个国家实施。然而,SRM是一个不完美的解决方案,因为它是短期的,并且有其自身的风险和治理挑战。在本项目中,我们试图了解SRM对未来气候管理战略的潜在影响、合作行动的前景以及国际治理的作用。关键的研究问题包括:SRM在什么条件下会鼓励搭便车、自由驾驶或合作?各国将把SRM作为最后的手段,还是在必要之前实施?SRM在包括减缓和适应在内的气候管理组合中可以发挥什么作用?各国对SRM偏好的异质性将如何影响合作潜力?国际机构如何在激励合作的同时,控制SRM所创造的自由驱动动力?本项目通过将理论、模型仿真和实验相结合来解决这些和其他研究问题,以追求三个具体目标:1。当一些国家有能力实施SRM时,开发和分析国际气候合作动态的博弈论模型。2. 设计并实现代表SRM关键特征的实验游戏,以根据实际行为测试理论模型,并为基于代理的仿真的开发提供信息。3. 模拟和实地测试国际治理和制度设计的替代框架,以最大的社会效益促进气候战略。虽然我们项目的动机是SRM作为一种非合作的、短期的气候变化解决方案的前景,但我们项目的见解可能适用于任何情况,在这种情况下,一项有风险的技术被视为传统上通过集体行动解决问题的快速解决方案。最后,项目团队提出了将理论、建模和实验框架转移到其他设置的机会。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
英文摘要
With recent scientific reports warning of serious global impacts if greenhouse gas emissions are not quickly curtailed, some nations or other entities may be inclined to pursue a technological climate management strategy that does not require international cooperation. Solar radiation management (SRM) is emerging as the leading candidate from among a variety of potential “geoengineering” technologies. SRM seeks to increase the amount of sunlight reflected back into space to offset the heat-trapping effects of GHG emissions. One approach, which involves widespread release of reflective particles in the stratosphere, is expected to be especially cheap and fast‐acting. This means that a single nation that is especially vulnerable to climate change may decide to deploy SRM, even if it is potentially detrimental to other nations. This research project is designed to investigate how the potential availability and implementation of geoengineering is likely to impact future climate action and impacts. The research team also explores the ways in which alternative international governance frameworks might promote strategies that lead to the greatest global benefit. The project advances existing theory and models of climate action by considering the potential evolution of decision making as climate change becomes more urgent and nations struggle to reach a cooperative solution. This theoretical advancement is reinforced by behavioral laboratory experiments as well as computer model simulations. By providing insight into the wider ramifications of geoengineering, The research is timely and socially relevant. Specifically, the researchers broaden the impact of the work via three main mechanisms: (i) Direct engagement of domestic and international climate policymakers, to improve mutual understanding of the implications of SRM; (ii) Translation and dissemination of our modeling and experimental tools and results for application to other problems in science and technology policy; (iii) Provision of socially relevant experiences for diverse students that develop their capacity to communicate with decision makers.Climate change is a typical public goods problem, requiring collective action to successfully co-manage. Global collective action on climate change is a challenge, however, as each potential actor has an incentive to “free‐ride” on the actions of others. This leads to insufficient overall action – the so‐called “tragedy of the commons.” This situation may be transformed, however, by the potential of solar radiation management (SRM) as a non‐cooperative climate change management strategy. In particular, the injection of reflective particles into the stratosphere may be a sufficiently cheap and easy means of cooling the earth to be feasibly implemented by a single nation. However, SRM is an imperfect solution as it is short‐lived and has its own risks and governance challenges. In this project, we seek to understand the potential impacts of SRM on future climate management strategy, the prospects of cooperative action, and the role of international governance. Key research questions include: Under what conditions will SRM encourage free‐riding, free‐driving, or cooperation? Will nations reserve SRM as a last resort, or implement it before it is necessary? What role can SRM play in a climate management portfolio that includes mitigation and adaptation? How will heterogeneity among nations in their preference for SRM impact the potential for cooperation? How can international institutions rein in any free‐driver impetus created by SRM while incentivizing cooperation? This project addresses these and other research questions by connecting theory, model simulation, and experiment in pursuit of three specific aims: 1. Develop and analyze a game theoretic model of the dynamics of international climate cooperation when some nations have the ability to implement SRM. 2. Design and implement experimental games that represent the key features of SRM to test the theoretic model against actual behavior and to inform development of an agent‐based simulation. 3. Simulate and field test alternative frameworks for international governance and institutional design that promote climate strategies with the greatest social benefit. While our project is motivated by the prospect of SRM as a non‐cooperative, short‐term solution to climate change, insights from our project are potentially applicable to any situation in which a risky technology is being presented as a quick fix for problems traditionally addressed through collective action. Finally, the project team addresses opportunities for transferring the theory, modelling, and experimental frameworks to other settings.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
期刊论文(7)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Learning to Manage the Multirisk World
学习管理多重风险世界
DOI: 10.1111/risa.13629
发表时间: 2020
期刊: Risk Analysis
影响因子: 3.8
作者: [Wiener, Jonathan B.]
通讯作者: Wiener, Jonathan B.
DOI: 10.1016/j.futures.2021.102811
发表时间: 2021-07
期刊: Futures
影响因子: 3
作者: [A. Pasek;D. Morrow;W. Lee;T. Felgenhauer]
通讯作者: A. Pasek;D. Morrow;W. Lee;T. Felgenhauer
Climate cooperation in the shadow of solar geoengineering: an experimental investigation of the moral hazard conjecture
太阳能地球工程阴影下的气候合作:道德风险猜想的实验研究
DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2022.2066285
发表时间: 2022
期刊: Environmental Politics
影响因子: 5.5
作者: [Cherry, Todd L., Kroll, Stephan, McEvoy, David M., Campoverde, David, Moreno-Cruz, Juan]
通讯作者: Moreno-Cruz, Juan
The Role of Non-Binding Pledges in Social Dilemmas with Mitigation and Adaptation
非约束性承诺在缓解和适应社会困境中的作用
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00645-y
发表时间: 2022
期刊: Environmental and Resource Economics
影响因子: 5.9
作者: [McEvoy, David M., Haller, Tobias, Blanco, Esther]
通讯作者: Blanco, Esther
共 6 条
    IUCRC Planning Grant Duke University: Center for Innovation in Risk-analysis for Climate Adaptation and Decision-making (CIRCAD)
    • 批准号:
      2413267
    • 项目类别:
      Standard Grant
    • 资助金额:
      $2.0万
    • 财政年份:
      2024
    • 负责人:
      Mark Borsuk
    • 依托单位:
    A Multi-level, Agent-based Model for Identifying the Factors that Enable or Constrain International Climate Change Negotiations
    • 批准号:
      0962258
    • 项目类别:
      Continuing Grant
    • 资助金额:
      $70.0万
    • 财政年份:
      2010
    • 负责人:
      Mark Borsuk
    • 依托单位:
    国内基金
    海外基金
    Research on Quantum Field Theory without a Lagrangian Description
    • 批准号:
      24ZR1403900
    • 项目类别:
      省市级项目
    • 资助金额:
      --
    • 批准年份:
      2024
    • 负责人:
      SATOSHI NAWATA
    • 依托单位:
    Cell Research
    Cell Research
    Cell Research (细胞研究)